


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27 April 1994



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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27 April 1994

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ARMED FORCES

Imminent Collapse Of Armed Forces Predicted

94UM0359 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET'S
in Russian 22 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Dmitriy Kholodov: "Pavel Grachev's 'Pavlovian' Reform: Russian Army Won't Be Driving Mercedes Any Time Soon"]

[Text] Seventy percent of all officers and warrant officers think their units are incapable of performing their missions. Up to 40,000 young officers leave the army each year. Understaffing of officers (especially young officers) has reached a critical point: .2 percent is the margin separating the army from a loss of combat readiness. Manning levels for enlisted men and sergeants are at just 54 percent. Army losses outside of combat zones stood at nearly 2,500 men in 1993, which is nearly 500 lives more than in 1992.

The Defense Ministry could lose control of the Russian Army in the near future. If this happens, General Grachev will be issuing orders only within the bounds of the "Arbat Military District"—the complex of General Staff buildings on the Arbat.

The situation is beyond belief. Boris Yeltsin, continuing the tradition of talking about the most important issues far away from official podiums, unveiled upcoming plans for army reform at a meeting with Suvorov School cadets. "The task of invigorating military reform has been posed. It is now possible to act more decisively and more consistently," said the president. The Russian Army will use a new principle to defend us—a mobile defense reminiscent of the American "flexible response strategy." Instead of unbroken defense along our borders, for which there is no longer enough manpower or money, we will have compact mobile groups trained to fight local wars. They will be the first line in the event of a "big" war.

However, Russia is embarking on a very complex reform with a Defense Ministry that has already demonstrated its utter inability to carry out reforms. In the two years since the creation of the Russian Defense Ministry, faith in democratic reforms in the army has been totally undermined. And the ministry leadership has managed to turn against itself not only officers, but also its own people. Hazing has become so bad in units, on ships, and even at schools that desertion has reached massive proportions. Youths avoid military commissariats like the plague. This was discussed at a recent conference entitled "Army and Society" in Moscow. After its harsh army conscription of students at vocational-technical schools, technicums, and commercial higher schools in the fall of 1993, the Defense Ministry, according to some reports, is already thinking about abolishing student conscription because the educational institutions failed to produce significant numbers of recruits.

Ideological control over the Armed Forces has now been lost. On February 23, as they observed the anniversary of the Red Army's creation, probably very few officers recalled that on May 7, by order of the first Russian president, the Russian Army was formed. After abolishing political agencies by Order No. 15 of January 12, 1994, the military leadership set no new ideological priorities, without which, unfortunately, our army cannot yet function. The Defense Ministry didn't even try to revive the traditions of the Russian officer corps. The resulting vacuum has willingly been filled by "patriots"—the newspaper ZAVTRA, with the disclosures of an anonymous general on the events of October, was read in some units until it had holes in it. Two years too late, Pavel Grachev remembered the Orthodox Church, on which the Russian Army was based before the revolution. It will probably be another two years before concrete decisions are formulated and chaplains appear in the units.

The armed forces leadership has also failed to protect the army from corruption.

The following is from a letter from armed forces and war veterans (!) to President Yeltsin:

At a time when the state has no way to promptly pay its soldiers, more than 20 billion rubles in public funds appropriated to the military insurance company (Reserve Colonel S. A. Tsikolyuk, president) to be used to provide servicemen with life and disability insurance, by order of Grachev and Vorobyev, were channeled to commercial structures through the Menatep Bank at an interest rate of 240 percent. No one knows who is distributing that interest and for what army needs.

Of the proceeds from sale of property belonging to the Western Group of Forces, less than 15 percent has been allocated to finance construction, purchase housing, and solve other social problems facing servicemen. On the other hand, millions of marks were used to buy an enormous quantity of calcium carbide, which is apparently no longer available in Russia, and various materials. Money was also found to buy a Mercedes Benz that our forces urgently need.

After the breakup of the USSR, we ended up with third-echelon forces. And the most combat-ready units were left behind in the ex-Soviet republics. Great hopes were pinned on the divisions being withdrawn from Germany, but they became drawn into commerce and are returning to Russia utterly incapable of combat. Things have reached the point where Polish racketeers working the highways have established special duties for Russian military transit drivers taking cars to Russia: A Russian warrant officer pays 200 marks, an officer 400.

It is said that when Soviet troop commanders moved from Hungary to Germany, the generals' plane was preceded by heavily loaded cargo planes carrying their personal property. "They took only the most essential items with them," the pilots joked. Does a person need a lot? As it turns out, yes. The cargo planes of the Western

Group of Forces were so heavily loaded that the first deputy commander of the 16th Air Army was arrested and jailed. Colonel-General Burlakov, the commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces himself, was involved in one case. Inspections were of little help. What commission can withstand the temptation of German marks, let alone German women! It is said that one general who headed a rear-services commission that was inspecting the Western Group came back with syphilis—a young woman's "gift" for him.

There is nothing surprising about the fact that the Western Group of Forces has become drawn into commercial activities—only command and staff exercises have been held there for some time, and the soldiers march on paper only. What is surprising is this: Just one or two cases of corruption have been made public. Yet such cases are legion. Is it any accident that Western Group of Forces Military Procurator Yuriy Yerin was recently promoted to general?

Reformers have been disliked throughout history. But Pavel Grachev's unpopularity is of a quite different nature. The minister has recently been accused of selecting personnel on the basis of personal loyalty, something that has repeatedly spelled the ruin of bureaucrats of various ranks. Moreover, military personnel are extremely vulnerable to protectionism: Officers are limited in their ability to earn money, and a military career is the only thing the state can use to entice them to serve.

Grachev's unpopularity with the troops has reached the point where instead of the honorable title "grandfather," which is bestowed on especially respected commanders, General of the Army Grachev is called by his first name, together with the word "Mercedes," for the car he travels in. A Russian defense minister can't ride in some Soviet Volga or Zhiguli!

The whole army is discussing Pavel Grachev's recent dispatch of his son to the Western Group of Forces, contrary to his own order stating that only servicemen with previous service in "hotspots" may be sent to lucrative Germany. Senior Lieutenant Grachev flew to the Western Group of Forces just a few months before the withdrawal of our last forces from Europe. When he returns, an apartment in one of the comfortable compounds the Germans built for the Russian troops being withdrawn might await him.

Such mistakes by the defense minister discredit the very idea of reform. The situation in the army is reminiscent of 1990-1991, when the unpopular premiers Pavlov and Ryzhkov attempted to reform the economy.

The Russian Army is no longer combat-ready today. There is just ONE Russian missile-armed submarine on alert duty in the ocean. (The Americans have 10 or 11 submarines.) Meanwhile, according to participants in the "Army and Society" conference, all reform has been reduced to the "signing of standard contracts, new uniforms, and higher pay."

A frightening process has begun in the army. District commanders no longer rely on their ministry and turn to local authorities directly for help. In this way, the army is becoming tied to regions, something that, in the event of a crisis, could break it up into component parts.

The Defense Ministry is making desperate attempts to enhance its prestige. General Kondratyev, the deputy minister, suddenly becomes a diplomat and goes to Nagornyy Karabakh to extinguish the conflict. Within a few days his much-publicized mission collapses, and now Kondratyev is giving interviews in the Dniestr region. Pavel Grachev is also making his diplomatic debut, but he prefers foreign countries.

In recent days the government has launched an outright war on defense appropriations. The Defense Ministry is asking for almost 60 percent of the entire state budget (almost 80 trillion rubles), saying the army could collapse. The ministry is indeed in a trap—the army has to be cut, since there is not enough money, but cuts are impossible because no money is available for the legally mandated payments and compensation either.

The situation is further compounded by the fact that in this transitional period, the old military administrative division of Russia into military district has been left intact. This essentially requires that the defense budget be doubled. But the taxpayers are poor, and so reform will most likely be of a shock-therapy character. The Russian Army, it seems, will have to cross the Alps yet again. But this time without Suvorov.

Golts: Peacekeeping Not Cover for Russian Interference

94UM0351A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA observer Aleksandr Golts: "Permission Not Necessary for Russian Peacekeeping Role"]

[Text] A rather unpleasant trend in international affairs has been gaining momentum. Someone wishes to render the peacekeeping operations Russia is carrying out in nearby countries problematic relative to Moscow's relations with our more geographically distant partners. Ever more frequent are statements made by public figures and the news media to the effect that Russia's peacekeeping activities constitute some kind of "dual nature." The matter in essence amounts to allegations that we are using the peacekeeping operations as a cover for "neoimperial ambitions", in that Russia is demanding the right to interfere in her neighbors' internal affairs. This kind of allegation is expressed succinctly in an amendment passed several days ago by the U.S. Senate without benefit of vote. Included in the part of the draft legislation, which deals with defense and foreign policy expenditures, is the following provision: "The United States will oppose, employing suitable measures, any efforts made by the Russian Federation to employ intimidation

by the application of military force or economic pressure to create a sphere of influence in the republics of the former Soviet Union..."

What is amazing here is that the document's authors are doing nothing more than shadowboxing. No one has yet been able to furnish any kind of convincing proof of Russia's interfering in the internal affairs of her neighboring states. Nonetheless, this kind of allegation is not without harm, since it creates the dangerous impression that Moscow "must be contained."

The above is why Russia's defense and foreign affairs ministries considered it necessary to issue a joint statement explaining Moscow's approach to the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Stressed in the statement is the following: "The actions taken by Russia are intended to merely effect a cessation of armed conflicts in a number of new and independent states, stabilize the situation there, and create conditions conducive to a lasting and stable settlement."

Indeed, Russia, which more than other countries is interested in the cessation of all military activities occurring on her borders, is shouldering a heavy burden in carrying out her peacekeeping operations. This is not to mention the approximate amount of 26 billion rubles spent for these purposes in only the last 10 months. Russia is risking the lives of her young men.

In this connection, and this is something of special importance in this situation, Russia's peacekeeping operations are not actions arbitrarily taken. They are being carried out in direct response to requests made by, and with the consent of, the respective states and sides engaged in conflict. The point here is that those who perceive the Russian peacekeeping as a "threat" are raising the question of mounting these operations exclusively on the basis of securing permission from the U.N. or the CSCE. And in this they are mixing two issues.

Yes, Russia is in favor of the widest possible participation by the U.N. and the CSCE in the settling of conflicts occurring in CIS member countries. However, there is no need to secure any "permission" from these or any other organizations or obtain any other legitimization of peacekeeping operations. It would be another matter to effect cooperation with international organizations such that the latter's active and substantial support would constitute meaningful assistance in the realization of more effective and rapid settlement of conflicts.

In this regard, it is unfortunately necessary to state that international institutions, in addition to the individual states that are so apprehensive of Russian peacekeeping, are not in any way anxious to demonstrate initiative in conflict settlement. Thus, our diplomats were unable to obtain a mandate for Russian troops from the U.N. or the CSCE for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. In addition, other states are definitely not enthusiastic about bringing peace to post-Soviet areas. Russia, however, is willing to participate in U.N. and CSCE peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former USSR.

Thus, as stressed in the joint statement issued by the MO [Ministry of Defense] and the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Russia is not pitting its efforts against anyone at all. We are not demanding that we be accorded a special position or exclusive role. However, Russia at the same time has no intention of backing away from her responsibility for her position in this key geographic area.

Lt-Gen Zolotov on Law, Order, Discipline

94UM0349A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Leonid Zolotov by Aleksandr Oliynik, place and date not given: "Still on the Agenda"]

[Text] **The maintenance of military discipline and order at a high level today, when the difficult process of reform of the Armed Forces is in progress and a mixed manning principle is being introduced, is a task of special importance. The Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District, Lt-Gen Leonid Zolotov, tells how things now stand in this most important area in the Moscow Military District.**

[Oliynik] Leonid Sergeyevich, for the first time in recent years the district military council, at which the problems of military discipline and order were considered individually, certified that the number of military crimes and incidents decreased by a factor of one-and-a-half in comparison with 1992 in the units and formations, and that the number of draft dodgers decreased by a factor of more than six. How was this achieved?

[Zolotov] The short answer is that the entire spectrum of problems of strengthening discipline and order in the units has constantly been the focus of activity of the CINC, staff, directorates, and services of the district. As required by the well-known order of the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation of 18 November 1993, we seek to ensure that work to strengthen discipline and organization is not reduced to a short-lived campaign, that in each military outfit an atmosphere of high demands and responsibility is constantly maintained, and that every violation receives a strict and principled assessment. As I see it, this is the main reason for the successes in our foremost units and formations.

For example, take the signals brigade where Colonel Aleksandr Semenovitch Semakin is the commander. The conditions of service there and the contingent of draftees are the same as in other units. Perhaps even more signal troops have to work away from the unit and participate in various kinds of classes and tactical exercises. But despite this, in the last three years there has not been a single serious incident there. In the military council, incidentally, the CINC Col-Gen Leontiy Kuznetsov analyzed the work style of this foremost commander and stressed that educational work in the brigade is reinforced by an exacting attitude toward the men with respect to regulations, combined with concern for them. Colonel Semakin himself and many other officers and

warrant officers are models of industriousness and discipline. Their subordinates see and appreciate that.

[Oliynik] What difficulties and problems do the commanders and staffs encounter in working to strengthen discipline and order, and in particular, how does [this work] influence the level of combat readiness?

[Zolotov] Today probably as never before it is important to evaluate the status of observance of regulations not from quantitative indices, but primarily from its real influence on the combat readiness of troops, and on the quality of combat training. Close analysis of the state of military discipline in the district's units for last year and for three months of this year showed that the level of organizational work of commanders, staffers and educational structures unfortunately still does not correspond everywhere to the provisions of regulations and to the requirements of the Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The military council and the district staff believe that it is this task of raising the disciplining influence of combat training, guard duty, work details, etc. that has not been fully accomplished. In this regard, I recall the words of the military teacher and leader General M. Dragomirov: "Discipline comes from the sum total of ethical and legal skills covering the entire content of the military goals of the soldier." The chief deficiency is that "the sum total of ethical and legal skills" is now by no means achieved everywhere.

[Oliynik] Could you give a concrete example?

[Zolotov] Of course. In early March, Pvt. Sergey Komlev from the Taman Division went AWOL from the unit and returned to the Ivanov military commissariat which had drafted him. It was learned that the soldier had been forced to seek protection at home because he could not find it in his company. Here much of the blame lies with the company commander Lt. Aleksandr Ebel, who was indifferent and ignored the soldier's complaints about headaches. The battalion and regimental staffs did not attach much importance to this fact. Nor did the deputy commander of the battalion for personnel work take the requisite steps. Need it be said that such actions by some officers demean the prestige of commanders and discredit military order itself?

[Oliynik] And how do you explain the fact that while there is some reduction in the number of crimes and incidents in the district, their seriousness has increased?

[Zolotov] Yes, this is a difficult question, which incidentally we also discussed at the military council of the district. To speak the language of numbers, we unfortunately had a 13 percent increase in the number of convictions for various military crimes, although the number of their participants decreased by 50 percent. We do not avoid blame for this, but it is not only a question of us. It is well known what sort of replacements we are getting now in the army. If we look at the statistics, we can see that in recent years every second draftee is not prepared for service either in the physical

or in the moral and psychological context. Who is guilty? The army? Every third has serious health problems. The number of persons with previous convictions and arrests has increased significantly. Representatives of various unofficial associations, including those of an extremist and mafioso bent, cause us a great deal of concern. That is, all of the sores that afflict our society necessarily create a heavy burden on the army as well. Here is an example that has already been reported in the press. In the Naro-Fominsk garrison, a soldier from Moscow, Pvt. Aleksandr Fedyunin, went AWOL from his unit. What prompted the soldier to do this? It was learned that the notorious "hazing" had been eliminated. There were no complaints against him either from his commanders or from his comrades in service. Now he has been arrested, and the prosecutor is investigating the incident. Of course, everything will be found out, but it takes a lot of manpower and resources, and people are pulled away from their immediate obligations; not to mention the anguish this causes to his parents and loved ones.

[Oliynik] In connection with the mixed manning of the troops, I would imagine a new problem has also arisen, the maintenance of order among the contract soldiers. Now they number more than seven thousand in the district, and soon there will be twice that.

[Zolotov] You have guessed correctly, there are problems with discipline even among the contract troops. Judge for yourself. Of the 7,360 enlisted and NCOs serving by contract in the district units, the command was forced to nullify the contracts with 1,266 of them within a month or two after signing, basically due to lack of discipline and low moral qualities. Despite all efforts, the commanders and staffs to this point have not managed to ensure that the contract troops are true professionals in military affairs, and serve as an example. Analysis shows that educational and legal work with this category of service members has still not brought the due effect. What is more, in many units there have been sharp conflicts with compulsory-service soldiers on matters of pulling duty in details and guard mounts and in daily life. A whole group of measures was required, involving careful selection of people for contract service and adapting them to the conditions of present-day military service. Perhaps in the future it would be more advisable to man some subunits solely with contractors.

[Oliynik] Recently a meeting was held between the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksey II and the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Pavel Grachev. A coordinating council for the resolution of questions of cooperation between the Orthodox Church and the army was formed. In your view, will this help to improve the moral climate in the military outfits, and prevent law-violations in them?

[Zolotov] I think so. Now when many moral criteria have been lost and ideals are blurred, as we work to educate personnel we cannot help but use the rich moral and ethical capabilities of the Orthodox Church and other religious faiths. For these purposes, a special plan

has been worked out in the units of the district, aimed at close coordination of the units with the clergy in the provinces. In particular, it is recommended that commanders of formations and units define procedures for arranging religious services for believers and members of their families outside the military garrisons in their free time. In the period of reception of the new replacements and on the days when the military oath is taken, priests will be invited to the units, and spiritual literature will appear in the barracks. In short, we hope that reliance on religion will justify itself, and in particular will influence the education of the men and their moral qualities.

In conclusion I want to stress that the army, as our entire society, has come up against a whole group of problems that must be resolved within the framework of military reform. And the strengthening of military discipline and order is one of these. Much has already been done toward this end. But whatever the successes, the question of strengthening discipline will never be off the agenda, so to speak. Education is a continuous process, and its ultimate goal is to bring the army together and raise its combat readiness.

Development of Independent Military Trade Union

94UM0348A Moscow SYN OTECHSTVA in Russian
No 14, Apr 1994 p 4

[Interview of Captain 3rd Rank (Res.) Mikhail Kolchev by Vyacheslav Mamontov, place and time not indicated: "Why a Military Trade Union?"]

[Text] *A lot has been said and written lately about the Independent Trade Union of Service Members (NPSV). Press attention was drawn to it by the scandalous departure of one of the leaders from the organization and his announcement of the self-dissolution of the NPSV. This incident also interested me. Especially since two years ago, as soon as the trade union appeared, I prepared the first article in the military press about it. How then are things going with the public association of service members today? What problems is the NPSV resolving in the field of social protection of the man in shoulder boards? I asked the Chairman of the Central Committee of the NPSV, Captain 3rd Rank (Res.) Mikhail Kolchev to talk about this.*

[Mamontov] Mikhail Ivanovich, two years ago, in instituting the military trade union, you made a loud statement about independence in its name. From what did you want to be independent? From the Defense Ministry? From the existing system of resolving the social problems of service members?

[Kolchev] Indeed, the name of our organization was perceived by many in the literal sense. But we were trying primarily to say to service members that we intended seriously and in a businesslike manner to work at the protection of their professional, socioeconomic, and spiritual rights and interests. And in these things one can hardly succeed by relying solely on oneself. For this reason, we immediately began to establish contacts not only with

the state organs, but also with the public associations that have set themselves the task of social protection of service members. We proposed to them that we join forces. The reply was a simple one: "Every man for himself." We came forward with the initiative to create a supervisory council, consisting of the representatives of public organizations of service members, for monitoring the expenditure of the resources received from the sale of written-off military equipment. It was calculated that by selling just one submarine, we could provide housing to all the apartment-less officers in Moscow. But this too turned out to be something no one needed. So we resolve our tasks by our own efforts, naturally without refusing the assistance of interested departments and organizations. In this context, we have established close contacts with the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Federal Employment Service, and the Russian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan.

[Mamontov] But after all, things did not develop smoothly between you and the Defense Ministry at first.

[Kolchev] I won't deny it. Bureaucrats turned up who, upon learning about our existence, tried to put a spike in the wheel. In accordance with the Law on Trade Unions, the ministries and departments are obliged to sign collective contracts for each year with the labor collectives (in the army these are military units). We sent all the constituent and organizational documents in this regard to the Defense Ministry, but they were pigeon-holed. They began to procrastinate, which we saw as an attempt to close the trade union. Military jurists joined the fray and tried to prove the unsoundness of our organization from the legal standpoint.

It was hard to guess where it would all end. But we found a quite simple solution. We prepared all of our programs and documents and wangled a reception with the defense minister. After becoming acquainted with our materials, Pavel Sergeyevich supported us. The approaches to resolution of the urgent problems of the army proposed by the trade union were a surprise to him. By all appearances, someone had given him non-objective information about us, which boiled down to [saying] that people had come together in the military trade union to fill their pockets at the army's expense.

[Mamontov] How do the rank-and-file members feel about these initiatives of the central committee of the military trade union?

[Kolchev] They support us completely. We keep them constantly informed about our work by sending out informational digests to the primary organizations. I have to say that the number of members of the NPSV is growing constantly. Recently "newcomers" have turned up in Kaliningrad, Orel, Voronezh, Liyepaya, St. Petersburg, Kursk, Samara, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Khabarovsk.

In order to combine efforts in social protection of service members, we have put forward an initiative for creation of a Federation of Trade Unions of the Power Ministries and Departments, and also put forward proposals to the corresponding authorities regarding the creation of trade unions of the Border Troops, the MB RF [Russian Federation Ministry of Security], the tax police, the customs committee, and the Cossack formations. Now there are already organizational committees formed to hold constituent conferences for these trade unions.

[Mamontov] Judging from the available information, the trade union is more known for its construction work.

[Kolchev] We are indeed greatly involved in supplying housing to service members. And here we have achieved some results. For example, jointly with the International Migration Commission (MMK) we have devised a program for construction of housing and social adaptation of service members. Its essence lies in the integrated resolution of the housing problem and retraining of officers and warrant officers, discharged to the reserves, for civilian specialties with allowance for the desires and needs of the regions for particular professions. The program also provides for allocation of resources to service members for organization and development of their own affairs. Implementation of the program began with the signing last year of a contract to finance housing construction with the Agency for International Development (AMR), which represents the interests of the U.S. State Department, and a contractor, the Fund for Financial Support of Small enterprises, which is a structural component of the NPSV. After this, an additional contract was signed between the AMR, the MMK and the NPSV for the retraining of discharged service members. The work done in this area by the trade union is unique in its way. You see, for the first time investment funds are being sent directly to the contractors, bypassing the state distribution channels.

But we are building housing not only with help from abroad. We are trying to find a construction contractor and a sponsor, and are finding parcels of land and signing contracts. For instance, we were able to reach an agreement with the Murmansk Nickel Combine for payment of construction for housing for officers of the Northern Fleet using their products. We found a company that would buy the nickel and pay the expenses for construction. The result: 20 families of the Northern Fleet members will have well-appointed housing. And the NPSV will receive nothing for itself from this.

Naturally we understand that we cannot stick solely to apartment problems. We also have other accomplishments. For instance, in seeking to expand participation of the military in privatization, we went to the government with a proposal to provide state support to the association "Russian Business Center of Reserve Service Members" organized by the NPSV. The association was to assume full responsibility for social adaption of former service members in a number of regions of

Russia. A draft order of the RF government was prepared regarding the creation of a network of production enterprises on the basis of the military camps freed up as a result of army reform, with the participation of discharged service members and their family members. Even now we have several such camps to our credit and are beginning work to implement this project.

The military trade union has established the "Military Investment Company," which is opening up the prospect of financing our further programs for social and general living arrangements of service members. Besides this, we have now begun implementing the international project "Russian Life" to create a military insurance company of the West European type, and are also working to implement the concept of a non-state pension fund for former service members.

[Mamontov] The military trade union is two years old. That is pretty young. It is true that you have a lot of work to do. But surely you didn't undertake this work for the sake of building apartments for discharged military, and creating different kinds of funds?

[Kolchev] The problems which we must deal with today naturally do not have to be inherent to the military trade union. Construction of housing, the retraining of discharged service members, these are state tasks. In the future we intend to ensure that they remain so. Through the legislative initiative which the military trade union possesses, in contrast to other public associations, we will defend the professional, socioeconomic, and spiritual rights and interests of service members. You see, now many different documents are appearing which infringe on the rights of the military, do not correspond to the provisions of the Constitution, and violate the generally accepted norms of human rights and freedoms. So we have no end of work ahead of us. And we have already set about doing it. We have prepared and sent to the government documents in which we ask the state to assume the obligation of providing servicemen with housing.

But ideally, the work of the trade union must boil down to accomplishment of middleman functions between the Defense Ministry and the persons signing the contract for performance of military service. Here we will have to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract, by providing legal, juridical, and social assistance to service members, and protecting their interests in different conflict situations with their employer. Without interfering in the principle of one-man command. As you see, it is a subtle and complex problem. And we have to be serious about it. For that reason we hope that the service members will support us in every way. After all, only by combining our efforts can we obtain respect for the army and for the military man, and be able to live and do our duty to the Motherland worthily.

[Mamontov] Thanks for the talk, and good luck in your work.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Military, Economic Utility of SS-25

94UM0355A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 51,
19 Mar 94 p 10

[Article by Colonel Petr Belov, candidate of technical sciences: "Who Needs the SS-25 Missiles?"]

[Text] A report recently appeared in the press that it has been decided to base the nuclear missile power of the future Russia on missiles of the "modernized SS-25 type." The optimum nature of such an important decision was confirmed by the opinion of the editor's office of the newspaper that is most read by intellectuals, which considers the SS-25 to be "one of the most successful mobile ground missile systems," and also by statements from a top scientist, an acting member and a corresponding member of several academies.

I admit that the decision to enter into polemics with respect to the correctness of such a choice did not come about immediately. Disturbing were the great authority of the indicated opponents, the author's lack of the corresponding scientific titles, and the difficulty that most readers would have in following the unavoidable factual details in the arguments. But should one remain silent if the consequences of this decision affect all of us in the most direct way? Especially since the references to authority are less convincing in comparison with the conclusions obtained below with the help of certain facts and laws.

Is Rearmament Necessary at All?

I remind you that in the event of the ratification of the treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START II) we will have to reduce the total number of nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500, of which 1,700-1,750 nuclear warheads will have to be deployed on submarines and the rest on heavy bombers and single-warhead ground-based missiles. The traditional superiority of the United States in aviation and the navy will force Russia to do all it can to preserve the combat capability of ground-based missiles even to the point of arming them with the maximum allowed 1,300 nuclear warheads. At the present time, however, we do not have that many single-warhead missiles and will scarcely be able to produce them by 2003.

Taking into account the approximately 300 mobile land-based single-warhead SS-25 missiles now in existence and 195 multiple-warhead SS-18's and SS-19's permitted for conversion, Russia will be forced to build approximately another 800 new missiles. Alternative decisions may be the following: Not to build any new land-based missiles but limit ourselves to the 500 that exist now and the same number of nuclear warheads on old bombers; begin to build new single-warhead missiles, not all 800 but half that many. My opponents favor precisely the

latter version, proposing that 60-70 percent of the missiles be in the form of modernized mobile SS-25's and the rest in silos.

The questions arise: Do we need the fortunately still unratified START II Treaty and in developing a new nuclear missile program should we proceed on the basis of its injunctions that are unacceptable for us? Who really needs SS-25 missiles that the media have praised? Can it really be that we cannot do without these "safe to operate" and "very economical" mobile complexes, which "do not burn in fire," "do not break apart on rocky ground," and "cannot be penetrated by various kinds of weapons"? And is not this campaign just the latest monstrous disinformation inflicted on the public?

In response to these questions, we will point out still another alternative—to refuse to ratify START II until there has been a thorough investigation of all the peculiarities of the rearming that it imposes, a comprehensive evaluation of the real performance characteristics of the SS-25, and an elucidation of the possibility of its improvement through modernization. At the same time, it should be remembered that the only reliable means of deterring an aggressor in the next 10 years is our multiple-warhead missiles in silos rather than the aging submarines and strategic bombers. The SS-25's under review here are inferior to such missiles in every parameter without exception—safety in operation, economy, and survivability; we will become convinced of this in a systematic way.

Are the SS-25's Really So Safe for Us?

The most significant shortcoming of mobile land-based (ground and railroad) strategic missiles is the danger from the nuclear warheads that they have and from the extremely toxic and explosive missile fuel. The threat of the occurrence of accidents with catastrophic nuclear contamination of the terrain was the reason why every country except Russia renounced such missiles. For a fire is possible in a collision with an SS-25 and this is the most probable cause of the explosion of the conventional explosive material in the nuclear warhead and the dispersion of radioactive plutonium. A burning nuclear warhead of a land-based missile cannot be extinguished by on-board water, as at sea, and cannot be dropped, as from an airplane. And this will take place on well-traveled roads rather than in the "far seas" or "way up in the sky."

It can also be asserted that fundamentally missiles of the SS-25 type cannot possess a high degree of safety while on the move. At least their safety is always less than that of naval and air delivery systems of nuclear warheads, not to mention stationary missiles in silos. Indeed, for the SS-25, it is significantly more difficult to preclude collisions with outside means of transport or the intentional or natural destruction of the road surface—at least because of the great accessibility of these missiles for outside persons in comparison with submarines on patrol and bombers. Just as obvious is the threat of other

preconditions for accidents (driver error and breakdown of the vehicle) that do not exist in silo launch facilities where there are no people around.

In this connection, the arguments for the safety of the present SS-25's linked with the mention of eight submarine disasters and the absence of such in the Strategic Missile Forces seem strange. The significantly larger number of submarines on patrol and the duration of these patrols is thereby ignored and no mention is made of the fact of serious accidents with the overturning of more than 10 missiles of the SS-25 type that took them out of action, fortunately without nuclear warheads burning or exploding. The quantitative assessments of the probability of accidents with SS-25's that the opponents have presented are quite erroneous: They have been underestimated by a factor of more than 10 in terms of one system per year and by a factor of 40 for the entire grouping of 500 missiles.

It is likewise impossible to agree with the assertions about the so-called safety of solid-fuel SS-25's and SS-24's. Why, then, is it recommended to personnel that they quickly abandon them in the event of a fire and move away to a distance of 2.5 km? Nor have people forgotten the explosion of the solid-fuel boosters of the American "Challenger" with the loss of seven astronauts and the tragedy in 1988 at the SS-24 assembly plant, which had to stop its work for a long time. The most frightening thing, however, as specialists at Arzamas-16 have shown, is the spontaneous start-up of the engines of the solid-fuel SS-25, for it is impossible to stop or knock down this monster flying over the earth. And it can fly to Moscow from that same Teykovo Kostromskaya Oblast. Basically this could not happen with liquid-fuel missiles.

About the Economy of Operation of the SS-25

Another argument in favor of the optimum nature of the building of new mobile missiles of the SS-25 type, in the opinion of their supporters, is their high degree of economy compared with the cost of stationary missiles. Such an assertion is fair, but only in part. It is not difficult to be convinced of this by examining in turn the expenditures necessary for the building and operation of different types of missiles and comparing them.

Yes, the deployment of SS-25's in the position areas of the silo missiles SS-17 and SS-18 to be destroyed will provide for a certain saving of funds: There are roads, towns, engineering structures, and communications. Instead of expensive silos, it will be necessary to build only ground garages with movable roofs for the launch of the missiles in the event of an extreme emergency. But is such an economy necessary if the volume of the previous network of roads is inadequate for the dispersion of SS-25's at safe distances and if you cannot move very fast on dirt roads? In such a case, all of the SS-25's will be the easy prey of naval "Tridents" even with less accurate and powerful nuclear warheads.

And the assertions of the low operating cost of single-warhead ground-mobile missiles do not stand up to any

sort of criticism. Taking into account the depreciation costs of the vehicle chassis, the network of roads, and the engineering structures as well as the expenditures for fuel and lubricants and the development and guarding of the patrol routes, the losses from disruptions in the transport of freight needed in the national economy, and the results of possible disasters, the operation of the SS-25 will be just as devastating as the use of strategic bombers and nuclear submarines.

A special category of expenditures has to do with need for a large number of operating personnel, which one must not fail to consider with the growing shortage of service members. Where can Russia obtain additional tens of thousands of people and what will they cost?

Nor should there be any illusions with respect to the low cost of converting SS-25 launch silos. For the reconstruction of a huge silo to suit a small missile will be just as costly as the construction of a new one. This will require work to uncover and revise numerous communication lines, the replacement of obsolete equipment, and the use of colossal amounts of concrete and the best kinds of cement and metal. And it is all senseless, because it will not give the silo the required survivability: The smaller the silo is, the more resistant it is to external influences.

Are SS-25's Dangerous for the Enemy?

Is it possible that the shortcomings noted above are more than compensated by the potential merits of the SS-25—its high degree of protection against any counteraction by the enemy and timely maneuvering? Indeed, in principle the mobile means of basing strategic missiles guarantees their invulnerability but under these conditions: If they are small in size, protected against outside influences, placed in containers camouflaged as normal freight, dispersed throughout Russia, and constantly or periodically change their location randomly.

Precisely this was the original intention of the creators of the SS-25 and it is precisely this desirable feature that its advocates are striving to present as reality. As a matter of fact, they were not successful in keeping it small and the camouflaging and continuous patrolling is impossible in principle and forbidden by the START I treaty that we have already ratified. Also, it is doubtful whether one can speak of random changes in the location of these missiles. The cross-sectional stability is quite unsatisfactory, the extremely high axial loads have rigidly restricted them to a limited number of roads for dispersal, and the great weight of the missiles along with the small power of the traction engine prevented flexible maneuvering through speed. We note that everything enumerated above is also fair for the railroad SS-24's that again exist only in Russia.

Hence it follows that with the knowledge of the permanent deployment sites (provided by START I), the unique unmasking features of ground-mobile missiles (this same treaty prohibits changes in form), and the existing means of space reconnaissance, the enemy has no problem in determining the present location of our

ground-mobile missiles and in forecasting their coordinates in the next 15 minutes. Under these conditions, the SS-25's and SS-24's are more vulnerable than stationary missiles in silos and even bombers and submarines in ports.

Indeed, the enormous size of the transport-launch container with the missile (the area of the external surfaces is more than 120 square meters) did not permit their being made of metal, which would require an additional increase in weight of hundreds of tonnes and would definitively deprive these missiles of mobility. In turn, the large lateral "sails" estimated at an area of 100 square meters or more as well as the inadmissibly narrow width of the track greatly facilitated the overturning of our ground-mobile missiles through excessive aerodynamic pressure. All of this made it much easier for them to be disabled through a powerful electromagnetic pulse, all sorts of firearms, and even simple overturning. But it is easiest of all to achieve the destruction of the patrolling ground-mobile missiles with the help of sabotage. For this it is sufficient to have several specially trained "switchmen" or explosive devices set up in advance near the probable routes that are tuned to the emissions of the moving SS-25's and activated from space.

And in the most extreme case, for the destruction of the mobile missiles that have miraculously survived, it is possible to utilize missiles of submarines cruising near enough to deliver their nuclear warheads to the position areas of the SS-25's within 15 minutes. Calculations show that in this time they will be unable to leave the range of their destruction through shock wave factors.

A comparison of the survivability parameters of mobile and stationary land-based strategic missiles indicates the preferability of the latter. Indeed, silo missiles are guaranteed protection against the electromagnetic pulse, firearms, and highly accurate conventional and nuclear weapons: Their reliable destruction requires an average of 10-15 cruise missiles with conventional explosive charges or 2.4 nuclear warheads. Taking into account the impossibility of destroying silos simultaneously through several nuclear warheads ("fratricidal effect"), the preclusion of their delivery through high-speed low-angle trajectories (which reduces the possibility of hitting and destroying hardened launchers), the high combat readiness of stationary missiles, and their great distance from the borders of Russia, the multiple-warhead SS-18's that we have in silos are capable of fulfilling their intended purpose even if it is just 5 percent of those left for the retaliatory strike, not to mention preventive and counter [otvetno-vstrechnyy] strikes. The ground-mobile SS-25 and SS-24 missiles now in existence are suitable at most for a first strike. So are not they (rather than multiple-warhead silo missiles) the "destabilizing" missiles that the United States so fears?

Is Modernization of the SS-25 Realistic?

Since the new nuclear missile program involves modernized missiles of the SS-25 type, it is appropriate to

analyze the possibilities of a fundamental improvement of existing ground-mobile complexes. Otherwise the arguments presented above may be rejected as not corresponding to the systems under development. The unconditional acknowledgement of the reality of their qualitative improvement is fraught with the danger of senseless economic outlays that are completely unacceptable in our time.

I dare to assert that the task of freeing mobile missiles of the SS-25 type from their shortcomings is not soluble in the next decade. The reasons for this are not only economic but also technical, organizational, and political. If we do not understand this, then once again the billions required for the modernization of the SS-25 will be totally wasted.

In the foreseeable future, we will be technically unable to build a miniature intercontinental missile and guarantee its invulnerability through the means examined above. The reason for this is the more and more frightening technological backwardness of the military-industrial complex and the prohibitions in START I.

Organizationally, it is presently impossible to raise the discipline of the movement of traffic on the roads of Russia or to improve the state of the roads and the safety standards for the entire population of the country. It is likewise impossible to interfere endlessly with the movement of national economic transportation or to establish an alienation zone around the patrol routes to reduce the danger of sabotage and the severity of possible accidents. It is equally unreasonable to keep mobile missile complexes at bases permanently and hope that they will be allowed to leave them in a threatening period.

Politically, it is hardly admissible to contribute to an increase in social tension—to raise the degree to which the people living near bases and the patrol routes of SS-25's are informed about the serious danger that threatens them. It is equally obvious that is unethical to keep citizens permanently ignorant of the terrible threat against them and not to prepare them in time to take action under the conditions of possible extreme situations.

The question arises: Why did the advocates of the SS-25 ignore these rather important aspects? Or is it possible that the author of these lines is wrong and there is no problem with the SS-25? Then why does no one refute him in a public discussion? But to be fair, I will note that that there were three published articles denying the danger of these missile systems for us. True, their authors presented incorrect arguments to justify their positions, but on the other hand, they did not forget to stress their own high scientific and official rank and in some cases involvement in the creation of the SS-25.

Still, in the opinion of independent experts, the problem with the SS-25 is extremely pressing. Moreover, every effort is being made to hush it up, which suits very influential forces: Our "partner" in START II, who is prepared to utilize them as his own "Colt" that is already

aimed at the heart of Russia; the generals from industry and the army who still hold their high posts; the corporate interests of a well-known group in the military-industrial complex that receives orders amounting to many billions for a mobile missile technology that is needed by it but not by the taxpayer; and the command of the Strategic Missile Forces that is striving to maintain the size of its staff and the number of generals' billets.

No, Russia has no need for START II and the SS-25 that are being imposed on it, neither for those in existence nor for modernized versions. Their acceptance will plunge the country into the next spiral of rearmament. The result is obvious—two zeros at the same time: The final destruction of the economy and the total loss of the country's defensive capability. So is it not better to realize what is happening in time and not to allow such a prospect? The time is not yet past.

Response to Belous on Launch-on-Warning Strategy

94WC0050A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
30 Mar 94 p 9

[Article by Valeriy Yarynich, candidate of military sciences: "Nuclear Strategies and the Control Factor"]

[Text] It is gratifying when from time to time our press publishes articles like that of V. Belous on the nuclear strategy of Russia (*SEGODNYA*, 9 February 1994). It is not even a matter of the content of the article, with some of the positions of which I do not totally agree. It is something else that is gratifying—our public is getting a greater opportunity to know and consequently, perhaps, to influence the resolution of vitally important and costly tasks. The time is receding into the past when fundamental decisions on questions of nuclear strategy and national security were the responsibility only of a closed military-political elite.

There is no need to fear that the involvement of independent experts and simply interested persons in this process will accidentally open up something that is truly forbidden—this can always be avoided. Moreover, in this connection the area of nuclear arms has a unique nature dictated by the absurdity of the unleashing of a nuclear war. In my view, this permits and even demands much greater openness than in the area of conventional arms.

In the mentioned article, V. Belous covered the strategies for the use of nuclear forces rather broadly and showed their dependence on the structure of the triad and the basic technical parameters of the weapons. But such an important factor as control plays an extremely important role precisely in the question of strategies for use. The possibility of implementation in the event of the necessity of a launch on warning [*otvetno-vstrechnyy udar*] or launch under attack [*otvetnyy udar*] (OVU and OU, respectively) depends to a decisive degree on the structure and characteristics of the control system. The author is correct when he speaks of significant inertia in the

process of the development of strategic nuclear forces. This also applies fully to the control system—grouping of command posts of all levels, communications network, and complex with the corresponding computer facilities. The expenditures for them are commensurate with the outlays for the weapons themselves, and hence there must be close coordination of questions involving control, the combat capabilities of the weapons, and the means of using them as a unified whole.

If one analyzes the strategy for the use of the strategic nuclear forces from the position of control, then the following may be noted: It is obvious that there are no and in the future will not be any particular difficulties with the command and control of a first nuclear strike if, of course, we are forced into it. I share the point of view of V. Belous about the theoretical admissibility of such actions on our part under extraordinary circumstances, although the determination of the conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons may somehow be justified is a very complex and delicate problem. In any event, in this point the new Russian military doctrine (with all of its other shortcomings in a number of other questions) appears more logical than the previous declaration that we would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. In my view, that declaration did not have any practical value for one simple reason: Any "right-thinking" potential aggressor cannot in his plans for attack bet on such promises by the potential victim; he is obliged to count on the worst for himself. My only objection to the author in this matter from the position of command and control is that submarines and mobile ground complexes are no less suitable for a first strike than are missiles in silos.

As for the concept of a launch on warning, here everything appears substantially more complex. Yes, today and in the foreseeable future the United States may rely on it along with other versions of the use of its nuclear forces. For Russia, such a strategy appears quite doubtful even now and all the more so in the future. The reasons are well known: The disintegration of the unified network of the missile attack warning system (half of the ground radar is now in the near abroad); our leadership has less time than does that of the Americans to make a decision (actually no more than 2-3 minutes) in the event of a strike from submarines in the Norwegian or Mediterranean Seas; the obligation of the president of Russia to coordinate his actions in an extreme situation with the leadership of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia, etc. But besides the "perforated" missile attack warning system and the rigid time limits, there are several other reasons that put into doubt the correctness of nuclear strategy relying on the concept of a launch on warning.

In the first place, the tendency in the reorganization of the Russian strategic nuclear forces in accordance with the START II Treaty is such that by the beginning of the next millenium the predominant role (in terms of the number of warheads) in their structure will begin to be played by the most survivable components—submarines

and mobile land-based missiles. Such a structure of forces will be less able than today's structure to justify the need for haste in retaliatory actions. In other words, the calculated capacities of launch on warning and launch under attack will tend to converge.

Secondly, as V. Belous justifiably notes, the realization of the agreement on the mutual nonaiming of missiles leads in practically any version to abandonment of the strategy of launch on warning. The deeper is the reciprocal lowering of the readiness of the nuclear forces of the sides, the more time will be required for its prompt restoration in a crisis situation. It is difficult to expect the participants in such a sprint to reach the finish line simultaneously. And since the time limit for reflection is already used up today, delay by one side of even a few minutes will automatically put it in the category of a launch under attack. To be specific, as a result of all that has been said, today Russia essentially already finds itself in this framework and the concept of launch on warning is becoming more and more theoretical, although it does maintain its previous deterrent influence.

Such an objectively existing reorientation of the axes of nuclear strategy does not appear to be accidental. It is possible that in our time the general change in strategic thinking, the agreement with respect to a common scale of human values, and the development of ties dictate a renunciation of equilibrium on the razor's edge. In principle, the very idea of an immediate and impulsive nuclear reaction to the information from technical means of warning (even if they are "absolutely" reliable) seems absurd. What is needed is a second, insuring basis that in a hypothetical crisis situation would give the right to make a mistake to those people who are responsible for the decision. The strategy of launch under attack is such an insuring support.

But here is what is interesting. Following simple logic, we will immediately come to this question: If the grouping of nuclear forces and the system for its control, being oriented toward the concept of launch under attack, guarantee reliable deterrence, then why does one need enormous expenditures to support even the possibility of a launch on warning? Of course it is impossible to separate these things completely, and it is not necessary. Even under the concept of a launch under attack, for example, the role of the missile attack warning system will remain important, in particular, for the issue of warning information and identification of the aggressor country. Nor does the task of making decisions and sanctioning disappear. But there is a question, as they say, and one must seek to answer it. In any case, the problem of the changeover to a strategy of launch under attack as the primary basis for deterrence appears pressing today. This change cannot be accomplished immediately. Ideological and technical studies will be required on a national scale as well as at the international level, because by its very essence nuclear deterrence has a bilateral (multilateral) nature. Let us briefly examine the main difficulties and tasks on this path.

The concept of launch under attack was always criticized and is being criticized now under two main criteria: The low retaliatory power (especially later on with deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons) and the large probability of the complete failure of retaliation because of the preventive decapitation of the command and control system. The scope of a newspaper article does not allow a full illumination of this aspect and therefore we will limit ourselves to a conclusion. The whole essence of the question is how in the case at hand to deal with the notions of "little" and "much." Formerly, each side made such an assessment independently, although from a mathematical point of view it is a matter of the risk of the partner and it would not be a bad thing to consider what he thinks about this. I personally assume that if the American "partner" were suddenly to plan a surprise nuclear strike against Russia, he would be deterred by the possibility of the retaliation, let us say, of 10-15 warheads with a probability of 0.1-0.2. Of course, these figures are taken as an example, but they make one think. Just recently, closed as well as open scientific investigations demonstrated the necessity of a launch under attack using several hundred warheads with a "guaranteed" probability. (One must assume 100 percent!?)

Such considerations could appear scholastic if behind all of this were not specific structures and levels of nuclear forces, groupings of command posts, and automated systems for control and communications, that is, a great deal of public money. I think that it is practically impossible to achieve a calculated probability of retaliation at a level higher than 90 percent: We lack the means to create such a system of command and control. Fortunately, it is not necessary to do this. Magnitudes of 0.6-0.7 will be more than adequate for deterrence, which appears more realistic even under the possibilities that we have today and gives a certain amount of confidence in the reasonableness of the switch to the concept of launch under attack.

Besides the indicated general assessment, a change to the concept of launch under attack will also require an analysis of the controllability of each component of the prospective structure of the Russian nuclear forces. And here a very voluminous and complex task comes on the agenda. By 2003 half of all nuclear warheads will be on board submarines. But the naval component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is significantly harder to control than the Strategic Missile Forces. It turns out that we are undertaking a drastic reduction of those forces that have the most survivable and operative command and control system, and at the same time we are increasing our reliance on submarines, although it is well known what a complicated technical problem it is today reliably to deliver an order to a great depth under combat conditions. Our unprotected transmitting radio communications centers in the superlong-wave band are essentially the only means that we have to resolve this task but they substantially more vulnerable to conventional weapons than are analogous systems in the United States. All of this means that after the realization of the

START II Treaty, with apparent external parity of forces, actually the power of our strategic nuclear forces will be substantially less.

There can be only two ways out: Either do not reduce the Strategic Missiles Forces or resolve the problem of dependable control of the naval component. Since it is impossible to stop the process of nuclear disarmament, the second choice remains. The fact of the existence of the problem of the control of submarines is the result of many years of underestimating this component, whereas primary attention was always given to the development of the missile forces. For this reason, as of today the Strategic Missile Forces have been most successful in resolving questions in the guaranteeing of control under the conditions of launch under attack. The technical work that the missile forces have done in several projects could also be utilized to resolve the problem of getting commands to deep submarines. This would make it possible to accelerate the establishment of a unified command of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, which appears expedient to ensure more nearly optimum use of nuclear weapons under the conditions of deep cuts in them.

The changeover to the concept of launch under attack is not limited to military-technical and economic aspects. Also required will be the continuous joint work of the "potential enemies" to support mutual confidence in the preservation of the deterrence factor from both sides. The deep cuts in arms will dictate such unusual cooperation. And here it is insufficient merely to demonstrate the weapons themselves, but it is also necessary to show the possibility of their use in the event of the need to do so. This applies in particular to the version in which both sides consider the strategy of launch under attack to be the main support of deterrence.

Showing our deterrent capability to the opposing side presupposes a certain degree of openness not only in nuclear arms themselves (which to a considerable degree has already been achieved today) but also in systems for their command and control. It is obvious that two extremes are unacceptable in this process: On the one hand, one cannot totally reveal the structure and characteristics of the control system, for this can increase the provoking aspect and threaten national security; but, on the other hand, it is also inadmissible to close this area completely, because lack of knowledge can gradually give other countries the illusion of Russian nuclear impotence, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences in a crisis. Apparently, the optimum solution is somewhere in the middle.

It appears that in the interest of supporting strategic stability it would be reasonable, along with the exchange of information on nuclear missiles between the sides, to begin a dialogue in the area of their command and control. The objective of such a conversation is to support confidence in the mutual capability of providing for nuclear deterrence under the conditions of sharp cuts in arms and taking into account the other big changes

taking place in the world. This will be particularly pressing in the transition to the strategy of launch under attack. In the final analysis, such an exchange must lead to the development of a methodology for a joint quantitative assessment of the minimum necessary level of reciprocal deterrence. This would make it possible to reach an agreement on deeper reductions of nuclear arsenals and to save substantial resources.

In the light of everything that has been said above, it appears logical for both nuclear superpowers to put their main emphasis on the concept of launch under attack as the most "humane" concept that corresponds to today's way of thinking and to simple logic. It is possible that launch on warning and launch under attack could even exchange places in the combat documentation at the command posts of the strategic nuclear forces. That is, launch under attack would become the basic concept and launch on warning an insuring concept.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the singularity of the problem of nuclear strategies lies in the fact that all of their variants will continue to coexist, and this connection I agree with the arguments of my respected colleague Vladimir Belous.

GROUND TROOPS

Ground Troops' Concern Over Weapons Storage

94UM0349B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Stepanov: "Armament Personnel Concerned: How Can They Go On!"]

[Text] The technical services of the Ground Forces find themselves in a difficult situation due to limited financing and a shortage of specialists.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Semenov and his deputy for armament Colonel-General Sergey Mayev held a meeting on March 31 with the deputy commanders for armament of military districts, groups of forces, and formations. They discussed problems of operation, restoration and storage of weapons and military equipment. Practical classes were held.

Add-On Armor for Trucks

94UM0352B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Vladikin under the "Arsenal" rubric: "The Ural Dons Armor"]

[Text] The wide troop use of motor vehicles as a means of transportation and their employment as a mount for various weapons systems comprise a compelling reason to become concerned about the protective properties and

resistance of vehicles to the effects of modern weapons. Tests involving exposure to mine explosion, gunfire, and shock waves have revealed, unfortunately, the vulnerability of series-produced vehicles to the aforementioned effects.

The above observations were supported by combat action experiences acquired in Afghanistan. Drivers of vehicles moving in columns would eventually learn of the bitter experiences suffered by comrades who fell victim to mines or were struck by bullets while behind the steering wheel. They undertook the practice of setting up inside the cabs pieces of armor taken from disabled armored personnel carriers. They would install the plates on the floor, on the sides, the doors, and sometimes on the windshields, leaving only a small port for observation.

The above served as the impetus for the concept and industrial production of local protection packages for series-produced vehicles. The first lot of this kind of equipment was subjected to testing even before our troops returned from Afghanistan. The protection packages won the unqualified approval of military leaders.

There are several versions of armor protection for motor vehicles. For example, a UAZ-3151 equipped in this manner is externally virtually indistinguishable from the standard model of this vehicle. In this case, the cab is structurally reinforced to take shields made of aircraft armor. Fastened to the floor are aluminum alloy shields offering protection against shell fragments. A special high-strength fabric fastened to the obverse side of the plates reduces ricocheting of secondary fragments. In addition, the windshield is replaced by a bulletproof version.

The Ural-4320 truck, however, is fitted with external armor plates, with armor louvers on the windshield (see photo). The vulnerable areas are protected in the amount of 55 percent. The armor plates are made of steel. Mass of the protection package is about 184 kg.

Mounted on the interior surfaces of the panels and doors of the cab of the KamAZ-4310 are armor plates. Attached to the windshield are steel plates with ports. The size of the observation window is adjustable by virtue of removable armor plates. Seventy percent of the vulnerable areas is given protection. Mass of the cab protection package is 285 kg, while that of the cab rear is 235 kg.

The armor protection package for the truck offers protection against bullets 7.62 mm in caliber and fragments with a mass of up to 2.0 g. It is stored as a kit that is easily installed on the vehicles when the need arises.

NAVAL FORCES

Adm. Yegorov on 1994 Operations, Manning

94UM0361A Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI in Russian
23 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Meeting of Commander-in-Chief Baltic Fleet Admiral Vladimir Yegorov aboard destroyer *Nastoychivyy* with ship officers not long before service holiday; prepared for press by Captain 2nd Rank Yu. Golovin, Baltic Fleet Press Center under rubric "From the Horse's Mouth": "Admiral Vladimir Yegorov: I Wish You Loyalty"]

[Text] Not long before today's holiday there was a meeting of Commander-in-Chief Baltic Fleet Admiral V. Yegorov with ship officers in the wardroom of the destroyer *Nastoychivyy*. It would appear that the not at all holiday-like questions raised during this frank conversation trouble more than just its participants...

[Question] Prestige of personnel afloat... It has been discussed for a very long time. At one time fleet newspapers even started a special rubric, but things did not go beyond discussions: It continues to be much more "prestigious" to serve ashore than on ships. Is there a hope that the situation finally will change?

[Yegorov] I am sometimes reproached because of the personnel afloat, whose interests of course are paramount. You, they say, still are forgetting the personnel ashore... But the fact is that as of today there are more than a thousand homeless among the ship element. With those housing crumbs we have in the Baltic it is very difficult to say how to observe parity in distributing it. My position is invariable: The priority must remain with personnel afloat. Believe me, this position is present in all decisions which I have to make, for if there are no ships, there also will be no fleet...

Recently, I together with an interdepartmental commission headed by Vice Premier Yu. F. Yarov prepared a government program with all adjusted figures for construction of housing in Kaliningrad Oblast both for the Fleet as well as for the 11th Guards Army and a border guard group. Supporting this three-year program requires R700 billion in current prices. We are not figuring on being allocated such money right away, but even one-third would be enough to correct the state of affairs, and very significantly. This is the main question for officers and warrant officers of ships and staffs of formations afloat. If there is a roof over the head, I am sure that service also will be normal.

I must say that much also depends on you yourselves in maintaining and elevating your prestige. Recently, for example, I met a young ship's officer who had not gone on leave for 1993. Was it really difficult to release him from the ship in good time as prescribed? The fact is that today a leave probably is one of the few things that supports a person on a ship in service, in health, and in contact with the family. One must be very attentive to each commander in such questions. If an officer has gone

on leave, let him rest as prescribed; if he has gone ashore, give him the assurance that he will not be called except in an emergency. Of course, feedback is needed here as well: Each ship's officer must give his commander the assurance that he too will not let him down.

In short, a genuine ship's family should behave in a family way... Especially now.

[Question] Ships need to sail. The professionalism of each specialist, the cohesiveness of the crew as a whole, and that same question of material support and the prestige of our service depend on this. Of course, a ship's long deployment, especially for one as large as ours, costs the state dearly. Nevertheless, how often will we see the sea this year?

[Yegorov] A very important question, and it was posed for the chief of the Navy Main Staff during his visit to our Fleet. Admiral V. Ye. Selivanov personally named the ships which must be sent on combat duty and sent to perform missions of official visits. Our counterproposals also were briefed to him. One was to send a group of ships to the Northern Fleet for an exchange of experience and joint performance of missions. This version is fully realistic. Participation of our ships—and under the full program—in joint Exercise Baltops-94 as well as official visits to ports of Belgium and Finland also is planned.

So you can be sure that my position and that of the Fleet Military Council unequivocally coincides with yours: Ships must be on long deployments as often as possible, no matter how serious the economic situation. We will take advantage of all opportunities for this.

[Question] Things are very difficult today with the manning of ships and units. Are there hopes for their improvement?

[Yegorov] The Fleet now is at 65 percent strength in authorized first-term positions, and this is double that of our Army colleagues. It is of course difficult to compare, inasmuch as our specifics differ. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some kind of practical conclusions. One is that appropriate positions in our shore units must be manned by women on a contract basis and the seamen and petty officers freed up from this must be sent aboard ships. And the priority here will be given to ships specifically of your formation so they can properly maintain technical readiness and perform missions at sea.

The second path of manpower acquisition is to increase contract recruitment for ships. Already today contract personnel make up 25 percent of first-term personnel. It is no easy task to surround these people with proper attention. The main question is where and how are they to live? We can offer them nothing for now other than a cabin or crew space. This means we must give the contract personnel an opportunity for normal rest and normal liberty, but many commanders are not even doing this. They are afraid, they say, that the seaman will use the freedom clumsily and get drunk... That also happens, but you must understand that with all the costs,

we must force this new institution to live. Remember 1975 for comparison, when warrant officers began coming to replace extended-term personnel. Then, too, there was much skepticism and even egging on. But the time came when they got on their feet and subsequently, including also today, turned out to be the most stable part of Fleet cadres. Now, for example, we are at 75 percent strength in warrant officers.

All this experience also must be transferred to work with contract personnel, giving special attention to seamen being discharged to the reserve. With consideration of removal of deferments from certain categories of the draft contingent, we are confident that we have the opportunity to improve manning significantly.

[Question] More and more often one has occasion to read and hear questions such as the following: Inasmuch as the military-political situation in the world as a whole and in Europe in particular has changed, is it advisable today for Russia to have large ships at all here in the Baltic?..

[Yegorov] The situation really has changed. For Russia these changes also affected the basing of Fleet forces in a most serious manner. We are moving to that minimum which, in accordance with the new military doctrine, would allow ensuring state interests in the Baltic Sea. Do not forget that favorable periods such as the present do not always happen... And the defense of Russian borders from sea sectors can be provided only by a fleet, especially in the Baltic, inasmuch as our borders here now have been moved back. And in contrast to the previous status of defense, it is specifically the ships that also are given the mission of covering our borders from the air...

And after that, genuine fleet service specifically begins with shipboard service, with service on 2nd and 1st rank ships; our ships cannot and must not limit their functions to deployments only in the Baltic Sea...

So Russia cannot get by here from any standpoint without large ships.

Take note: In all the talks on arms and armed forces, the Americans, for example, simply exclude their naval forces from discussion. They say that the Navy for us is the very same as railroads for you in Russia. But we will not forget that Russia also was and remains a great naval power, and I am deeply convinced that this difficult time will pass and the Russian Navy will take its fitting place, for the Navy always was the quintessence of the nation.

[Question] If one looks at how much money is being allocated for laying down and building new ships and equipment, there are few grounds for such optimism...

[Yegorov] Funds for maintaining and developing the military-industrial complex really are insufficient, especially if we compare them with previous times. But there also is no longer that gap which existed in 1992... Financing is growing. Most important, in my view an

understanding already has formed "on top" that if we let it go today, we never again will make up for it.

So I remain an optimist, and I am not the only one, judging from the fact that submission of requests by officers to be discharged to the reserve practically has stopped... I would like to thank you, too, that you are preserving loyalty to your profession, to your ship and to our flag. Without this loyalty we would not have been able to safeguard the backbone of the Fleet. I hope that our officers and warrant officers will preserve this loyalty tomorrow as well. I wish you this specifically.

Pacific Fleet Financial Situation

94UM0349C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Nikolay Litkovets: "Fleet in Financial Squeeze"]

[Text] After failing to pay off the Pacific Fleet last year, the government continues to "experiment" this year as well. In January the financial requirements of the Fleet were met only to the level of 25.3 percent, in February only by 36.5 percent, and at the end of March, only by 18 percent.

As was noted by the Chief of the Financial and Economic Directorate of the Pacific Fleet, Colonel N. Sheremetyev, the Fleet cannot even pay for bread for the

table of compulsory-service seamen, not to mention paying plants for ship repairs. In the near future complete disconnection of naval forces from energy supplies is expected.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Conference on Military Agriculture

94UM0349D Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Petr Altunin: "Ninety-Nine State Farms Produce Goods Worth 30 Billion Rubles"]

[Text] A conference of the supervisor personnel of military agricultural enterprises was held. In a report by the First Deputy Chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant-General Vyacheslav Vasenin he gave a detailed analysis of the work of the military state farms and unit welfare farms, and marked out the paths of their further development.

At present there are 99 military state farms in the Armed Forces, and 3,800 unit welfare farms. Their economic production work in 1993 made it possible to provide the troops with meat for 2.6 months, eggs for 4.1, potatoes and vegetables for 2 months, and milk for a year.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian-Moldovan Talks on 14th Army, Dniestr

94UM0351B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Stepanov, Ground Troops Press Center: "14th Army Included in Talks"]

[Text] A group of officers and generals headed by Ground Forces First Deputy Commander in Chief Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev is to fly to Kishinev on 4 April 1994 to take part in the eighth round of Russian-Moldovan talks.

To be included in the discussions is a draft of the Agreement on Status, Conditions, and Procedure for Withdrawal of the 14th Army. Also on the agenda is discussion of attendant issues: Problems related to social and pension benefits for military personnel, aviation activities, real estate, property sales procedure, apportionment, inspection of troops, and jurisdiction issues.

UKRAINE

Political Groups Set Forth START-1 Stances

94UM0362 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
8 Apr 94 p 3

[Article from Vybir Independent Information Agency special for NARODNA ARMIYA: "A Non-Nuclear Ukraine. Too Cheaply?"]

[Text] *Should Ukraine be a non-nuclear state? That is the general question that includes thousands of other questions that have been officially resolved today. One step in that direction was the signing of the trilateral agreement in Moscow and the ratification of the START-1 treaty by the Ukrainian parliament. But it cannot be considered closed, not only because Ukraine has still not yet joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also because the official stance does not always coincide with the views of the leaders of the existing political forces.*

The Right

The head of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, Stepan Khmara, feels that the signing of the trilateral agreement is a violation of the Constitution and a political stunt. The stance of UNSO is based on the postulate that Ukraine should be a nuclear power, since it has an age-old enemy right next door. By turning over the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine should without doubt simultaneously think about creating "its own nuclear bomb" today.

The head of the KUN, Slava Stetsko, had a negative opinion of the signing of the "trilateral agreement": "...KUN feels that this statement could not be signed, since after all it was not the only way out of the situation;

quite a few influential politicians and commentators have stated that they understand why Ukraine is not rushing to disarm—it is afraid of Russia. The more so considering the recent evidence of aggressiveness... Russia is trying to return the former republics to its lap somehow, announcing its claims to the right to carry out 'peacekeeping operations' on that terrain. They are maintaining their troops in the Central Asian republics and arranging provocations in the Caucasus and the Transcaucasus, as a result of which blood is being spilled. So returning to the problem of nuclear weapons, I would point out once again that the trilateral declaration is a mistake. We are not against disarmament in general. We are for a non-nuclear Ukraine. But in a non-nuclear world."

Unequivocal support for the idea of a strong nation state is characteristic of the representatives of the right wing; such a state is impossible today without nuclear weapons as a factor in restraining instability in its foreign-policy priorities with Russia, from their point of view.

National Democrats

The convictions of some representatives of the national-democratic bloc are close to the positions of the right-wing parties. And although they advocate the idea of a non-nuclear Ukraine, they also would accept nuclear weapons as one of the determining factors in the security of the state and property, and which should be sold as dearly as possible.

Mykhaylo Horyn, the chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, feels that the trilateral agreement is an exceptionally important document that requires profound analysis, but "to accept it as is, as it is now, would signify a serious blow to Ukraine."

Rukh leadership member Ivan Zayets holds a similar viewpoint. He asserts that "there is no document today that discusses weapons, as well as strategic nuclear weapons, in full. We have no document of what the concrete guarantees of the national security of Ukraine will be. We have no document today that revokes the territorial claims of Russia against Ukraine." Ivan Zayets feels that as a consequence of the incarnation of this document, Ukraine will be destroying not only the nuclear warheads, but will also have to destroy the entire infrastructure—the aircraft, the ships, the missiles, the silos.

Larysa Skoryk expresses complete support and understanding of the actions of the president. She considers the transfer of the nuclear weapons to Russia the first step toward getting out of the economic crisis that Ukraine is experiencing today. "The resolution of the nuclear problem, this hopeless nuclear 'kindling' that lies on our territory and which an outside hand could always ignite, from which we have gotten nothing but worry and a negative attitude toward ourselves, would open up a new way for Ukraine to receive urgent credits, of which, I am convinced, the very first portion should go to resolving the issues of food and power resources."

The Centrists

The political parties on this portion of the spectrum have indicated clearly that Ukraine should be a non-nuclear state, and should accept nuclear disarmament as a contract from which the greatest profit should be obtained. Leonid Kuchma, who today holds a position close to that of the PDVU, for example, sees this contract as unsuccessful: "They already have us wrapped around their finger, whatever may be said now."

Volodymyr Filenko, the leader of the Party for the Democratic Resurrection of Ukraine [PDVU], says that "the trilateral agreement pertaining to START-1 signed in Moscow could be considered positive as a whole, but the details could be disputed: How much of a security guarantee there is, whether the nuclear fuel be returned to Ukraine, and guarantees of compensation to Ukraine."

"One of the basic program principles of the Green Party is to fight for a non-nuclear Ukraine. We are succeeding in this, but there are certain reservations. While entirely supporting nuclear disarmament, for example, we have reservations that in the case of our use of nuclear fuel, we will once again be energy-dependent. Because the nuclear fuel will be processed abroad, and we will have to buy it...,," says Volodymyr Kononov, the head of the Green Party of Ukraine.

The social democrats hold a similar, clear-cut position. Yuriy Zbitnev, the head of the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine: "Ukraine should, of course, be a non-nuclear state in the process that has started today as a whole." But in evaluating the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, he said pointed out that "in any case the signing of the agreement on nuclear disarmament will be an extraordinarily great step for Ukraine. The evaluation of that step should come in the next two or three years. The compensation will provide us with electric power, power resources and the possibility of creating a stabilization fund for the hryvnia. If the agreement really does provide an impetus for the world disarmament process, then it will be a substantial result. But if this process puts us once again on our knees before neighboring states and threatens the security of Ukraine with regard to the Near East, where the processes of nuclear disarmament are still only being planned (and it is doubtful that they will be developed in the near future), then the evaluation will of course be quite different."

The Left

Sympathy with the idea of the nuclear status of Ukraine is felt to be lost among the socialist camp. This question is being considered within the context of a system of collective security, which cannot be created today without tensions in mutual relations with Russia. Oleksandr Moroz, the head of the Socialist Party of Ukraine: "We have taken on the resolution of a great many issues that have not permitted us to be occupied with the economy or strengthening the independence of our nation. National security is not guaranteed anywhere

in the world through one's own forces alone. The mechanism of collective security operates all the time to this or that extent. We, in our jingoistic patriotism and ignorance, have rejected that. What has the state gained in that regard? Nothing. We have only lost the status of a nuclear power, a high technical level of production, and scientific and technical potential."

It is obvious from all of the aforementioned that the leaders of the leading political forces, independently of their positions with regard to the nuclear status of Ukraine, for the most part do not accept the form in which the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from the territory of Ukraine has been proposed. Most of them approve of the idea that this step was a mistake in the foreign policy of Ukraine. It is becoming more and more comprehensible that the question of nuclear status has no easy solution.

Russia's Actions in Crimea Viewed

Admiral Ryzhenko: 'Violations of Agreements'

94UM0327A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
17 Mar 94 p 1

[Press Center of the Naval Forces of Ukraine: "The Command of the Black Sea Fleet Is Violating Existing Agreements"]

[Text] In an interview with a UNIAN correspondent, Vice Admiral Oleksiy Ryzhenko, chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine [Viyskovo-Morski Syly Ukrayiny], stated that the command of the Black Sea Fleet, which de jure remains subordinated to the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, has lately committed a series of violations of existing agreements with respect to the Fleet. He reported that in fact the Black Sea Fleet command does its best to ignore the Ukrainian side and is directly subordinated to the command of the Navy of the Russian Federation. The recent unannounced training exercises conducted by a large group of ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which were not approved by the appropriate structures, serve as further evidence of this. Temporary regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are being introduced in the formations [zyednannya] and units of the Fleet. An earnest effort is under way to educate Black Sea Fleet personnel exclusively in the traditions of the Russian Army and Navy, despite the fact that more than 50 percent of the men serving in the Fleet are conscripts from Ukraine.

This is particularly evident in the case of the naval infantry brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. In violation of the existing agreement regarding manning the Fleet with equal numbers of conscripts from Ukraine and Russia, brigade personnel who have been discharged into the reserves are being replaced exclusively by conscripts from the Russian Federation. The men in this formation are being told that they are serving in a naval infantry

brigade of the Armed Forces of Russia. This is eloquently confirmed by the fact that the members of the brigade wear Russian insignia on their uniforms, that the St. Andrew's flag flies over the staff headquarters, and by certain other facts. In addition, there has recently been a marked increase in office facilities and equipment [orhtekhnika] provided for the subunits of this formation, and the number of personnel in the brigade has more than doubled.

It is Oleksiy Ryzhenko's view that in order to prevent a rise in tensions in the Crimean region, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet must do everything in his power to ensure that no actions are taken in violation of existing agreements and the principles of equality and brotherhood established in the relations between the people of Ukraine and Russia and the Armed Forces of our two states.

Meshkov's Actions 'Contrary to Law'

94UM0327B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
29 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Oleh Makhno: "Why Is Meshkov Violating the Laws of Ukraine?"]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of our life is that the more our "power wielders" talk of a civil society, the more they are apt to violate the law. Now we have the president of the Republic of Crimea engaging in the same conduct—his preelection promises notwithstanding, he is disregarding the Ukrainian Constitution. Thus, following a rainy Thursday, having set his Komandirskiye wristwatch by the tolling of the Kremlin bells, he issued another of his directives to the Crimean [military] commissariats regarding the next call-up of young Crimeans to military service with the instruction that they should serve only on the Crimean peninsula. Not a foot, booted or bare, is to step beyond the isthmus!

"This directive is illegal. There is no foundation for it whatsoever," said Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, Ukraine's deputy minister of defense, at a press conference held upon his return from Crimea at the end of last week. "The military leadership (I have in mind the military commissar of Crimea, Major-General Volkov, and the commander of the army corps, Major-General Kuzmuk) also know this and will carry out the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's orders to act in accordance with acting legislation. In other words, the conscription of youths will be conducted according to the extraterritorial principle."

To be sure, this does not mean that all Crimeans will serve exclusively outside the territory of the Crimean Republic, added Col-Gen Ivan Bizhan. There are a number of preferences [pilhy] under which a certain category of conscripts will be allowed, as before, to undergo their military training not far from home. These preferences are well-known, and they are taken into

account by every military commissariat in Ukraine. But the total number of such youths will not exceed 20 percent.

If only matters were confined to this attempt by Meshkov to place the Crimean commissariat system under his jurisdiction. But the "campaign" is much broader in scale. Meshkov's cabinet has issued several other "military" directives that clearly exceed this body's authority. For example, the directive to submit full information on the deployment of the units and subunits of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, on their structure, military objectives, etc. That is how the authorities in Crimea want to let us know that they would like to form their own armed forces...

It is unlikely that the Crimean president and his military advisors expect to receive this information. Nor do they have any need of it at present. In I. Bizhan's view, the main objective is to raise a political outcry and create tension surrounding these issues (and that of conscription, in particular).

In all likelihood, Meshkov's team has not yet gotten over its recent presidential election campaign and is confusing it with the realities of the present. And this is no longer funny. It is one thing to make the Crimeans sit down an hour earlier to their dinner tables and quite another to put young conscripts in the dock for failing to carry out the Law on Military Duty and Military Service (and this outcome is not out of the question should the conscripts and their relatives heed the calls to unlawful actions). That is why Col-Gen Ivan Bizhan asked the members of the mass media to report this event accurately and explain to the public the position of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Certain advisors to the president of the Crimean Republic are very active. We have in mind the specialists on military affairs who until recently wore military uniforms and still cannot reconcile themselves to their new status of reservists. Thus, one of them suddenly decides to "correct the actions" of the military subunits and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, while another decides to conduct "authorized" inspections. One cannot help but be reminded of old circus nags that start to dance out of habit as soon as they hear any kind of music. It should be noted that, as a rule, these reservists' nostalgic charges are seen as poor jokes—the kind that one is embarrassed to laugh at and ashamed to tolerate. But if the supporters of the Crimean president want to question the competence of the military leadership of the army corps, they have absolutely no grounds for this.

"I myself head the certification commission," said Col-Gen Ivan Bizhan, "and I have complete confidence in the professional qualifications of the officers and generals serving in the units stationed on the Crimean peninsula."

During his visit to Crimea, Maj-Gen Ivan Bizhan also met with Admiral Selivanov, the chief of the Main Staff of the Navy of the Russian Federation. Their talks

centered on a number of fundamental issues regarding the Black Sea Fleet. Among them—the fact that the Russian side exceeds its authority in the command of the Fleet, the Russians' desire to unilaterally dispose of the Fleet's material assets, and their resistance to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's demand for an immediate inventory of the Fleet's property as stipulated by the government agreements reached in Massandra and Yalta. Unfortunately, the Russian side has once again attempted to pass over these questions and has failed to answer why only citizens of the Russian Federation are being recruited to the elite unit of naval infantry contrary to the "50-50" provision called for by the agreement.

Admiral Ryzhenko: Ukraine's Case on Black Sea Fleet

94UM0327C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
31 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Rear Admiral Oleksiy Ryzhenko, chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, under the rubric "From the Standpoint of a Professional"; "The Black Sea Fleet: Myth and Reality"]

[Text] The notion that Ukraine does not need to create its own Naval Forces and that the Black Sea Fleet is one and indivisible and fully capable of defending the interests of both Ukraine and Russia on the southern maritime border is currently being promoted with increasing persistence in the mass media and in statements by Russian political leaders at various levels and by high-ranking officials of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Black Sea Fleet. Without entering upon a discussion of the political reasons behind these statements and the reasons why the interests of Ukraine have become so dear to the Black Sea Fleet, I would like to express my views from a professional standpoint regarding the military potential of today's Black Sea Fleet and its present condition.

An objective analysis shows that today this Fleet is not capable of successfully performing its tasks. The claims about its high level of combat readiness are pure myth that belie the real state of affairs. Numerous facts attest to this. The Black Sea Fleet is equipped with obsolete models of missile weaponry of the former USSR, some of which are no longer produced by industry. For the past seven to ten years, no regular maintenance [planovi remonty] has been performed on the missile/artillery weaponry [raketno-artyleriyska zbroya], and only breakdown repairs [avariyno-vidnovchi remonty] are being carried out. Considering that the average age of the ships is 15 to 20 years and that lately no funds have been spent on their maintenance, it is obvious even to a nonspecialist that the Fleet will die of its own accord by the year 2000 because it will be morally obsolete [moralno zastariyy], as well as because of its technical condition. Given their service life and technical condition, it makes no sense to modernize and refurbish these ships. The intensity and quality of ensuring their combat readiness

has dropped for many reasons. One-time sorties by a group of 20-25 ships are hardly proof of the Fleet's might and combat readiness. Hence, it is a myth to describe this Fleet as a guarantor of the CIS.

For several years now, no new surface or underwater ships and no auxiliary vessels have been added to the Black Sea Fleet. The majority of the combatant ships need both minor and capital repairs.

Currently, 20 combatant ships of the Black Sea Fleet, five submarines, 20 auxiliary vessels, and five special-purpose vessels are undergoing repairs at Ukrainian ship repair facilities. Plans call for sending another 77 ships and vessels for repairs.

As we know, even the shortest halt in the development of military equipment is intolerable, because it becomes both morally and physically obsolete very rapidly. Thus, if the ships of the Black Sea Fleet are not being equipped with the latest equipment today, one can hardly speak with any credibility about their high level of combat readiness.

Take, for example, one of the mine-sweeping elements [divizion tralshchykiv] of the 68th brigade of the Sea Area Defense Force [OVR]. Half the mine-sweepers in this element were put into service before 1975, or almost 20 years ago. Their twenty-year-old sweeping and other equipment is hardly likely to be suited to sweeping for today's mines.

The situation in other subunits, units, and formations of surface ships is similar. Nor is the combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet's submarines up to the necessary level. There are plans to write some of them off as unsuited for further military service. Some have been unable to sail for a year because of damage to some material part, because their storage batteries have run down, etc. For example, the storage batteries in all the submarines in one formation have been fully depleted or are nearing depletion, and the submarines have been off combat-ready status since February of this year. The command of the Black Sea Fleet is planning to remove them from active service in the combat-ready forces and mothball them.

One hundred percent of the aircraft fleet of the Black Sea Fleet needs to be renewed. Due to a lack of fuel and lubricants [PMM] and spare parts, there are almost no training flights for aviation personnel. Under such circumstances, the skills and expertise of flight personnel grow rusty.

The hydrographic department of the Black Sea Fleet is not performing its full range of duties from Izmayil to the village of Chornomorske and in the vicinity of Yalta because there are no funds to pay rent for this territory. The Black Sea Fleet is in a difficult financial situation.

There are extremely serious problems in the staffing of the Fleet's subunits, ships, and units with command cadres. For example, only one-third of the ships in the

mine-sweeping element [divizion morskyykh tralshchykiv], of which we spoke earlier, have Combat Section-1 [BCh-1] and Combat Section 2-3 [BCh2-3] staff commanders. Only 60 percent of the slots for warrant officers [michmany] and 50 percent of those for petty officers [starshyny] are filled. Every second ship lacks such leading specialists as sonar operators [akusty] and radiometric operators [radiometrysty]. When making sorties for military training exercises, ships are forced to "borrow" sailors, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers from the ships remaining in port.

A similar situation exists in many other subunits. At present, 20 percent of all junior officer slots are unfilled. Graduates of Russian military schools are unwilling to serve in the Black Sea Fleet because of the unstable situation.

The command of the Black Sea Fleet is forced to reorganize the Fleet. This reorganization anticipates retiring a number of obsolete and unsailable [nekhodovi] ships and transferring their specialists into the crews of operating ships. Certain subunits and units of the Black Sea Fleet are being reorganized, and ships and vessels are being removed from active service and mothballed.

For example, in September of last year, a separate helicopter regiment was disbanded in one of the garrisons. A radiotechnical observation platoon [radiotekhnichnyy vzvod sposterezheniya] was disbanded at one of the bases, which had a sharply negative impact on navigation in this region of the Black Sea. The construction of a secure command post [zakhyshchenoho komandnoho punktu] of the staff of the Black Sea Fleet has been frozen. The expensive equipment that had already been installed there is being stolen.

The incidence of theft and squandering of equipment and other property is very high in the Black Sea Fleet. The number of such incidents is rising in spite of the fact that criminal charges have been lodged in some instances. As, for example, in connection with the disappearance in one of the units of 44 silver-zinc batteries valued at many millions of rubles.

The number of ships, vessels, and military equipment that is being written off, as it were, is also very large. All this is being done unilaterally, without the approval of the Ukrainian side, even though, as has already been stressed, the Black Sea Fleet in this transitional stage belongs to Russia and Ukraine in equal parts. Nevertheless, the fleet takes orders only from Moscow. Thus, the Commander in Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation issued an order on 24 August 1993 instructing that 15 combatant ships and vessels, including the SKR Krasnyy Krym [guided missile destroyer Kashin class DDG], several submarines, amphibious assault, and other ships be written off during 1993-94. In the aviation units, aircraft equipment and motor vehicles [aviatsiyna i avtomobilna tekhnika] are being written off in bulk and by the piece, as they say.

The large-scale commercial activity on the Black Sea Fleet cannot help but be of great concern as well. This activity is also being carried on unilaterally, without the participation of the Ukrainian side and without handing over 50 percent of the earnings from the sale of this property to Ukraine as required by the existing agreements. The PSK Donbass [coastal rescue ship], the SRZK Ladoga and Kursk [AGI Mayak class] have already been sold to commercial structures at below-market prices, and the SRZK Ritsa [AGI Mayak class] has been handed over to the hydrographic department to be passed on to businessmen. The RS-239 and the PAS Kuban [personnel support ship] have been given to Bulgaria purportedly in payment for repairs performed for the Black Sea Fleet.

The facts cited above are only the visible tip of the ruinous process of squandering and theft that is taking place in the Black Sea Fleet. Much of what is happening here is veiled in secrecy. And the commands of the Navy of the Russian Federation and of the Black Sea Fleet fiercely defend these secrets. What other explanation is there for the categorical rejection of the insistent and frequent demands of the Ukrainian side that a competent bilateral commission conduct an inventory of the Black Sea Fleet's assets and determine what it possessed on 6 December 1991?

It is clear from the facts presented above, as well as many other facts known to us, that to speak of the Black Sea Fleet as a guarantor of Ukraine's security is, at best, irresponsible. The Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine, and the borders of Ukraine are protected by her Armed Forces, including those that are stationed in the autonomous republic.

The security of the people of Ukraine can be guaranteed only by her own Naval Forces. According to the document signed by the two presidents in Yalta, these Naval Forces, like the Navy of the Russian Federation, are to be created on the basis of the existing Black Sea Fleet. Only after this has been done will it be possible to consider unifying the command of the two fleets, which could ultimately guarantee the security of Ukraine and Crimea as well as the Russian Federation on the southern maritime perimeter.

New Corps Commander in Crimea on Regional Forces

94UM0326A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Major General Oleksandr Kuzmuk, commander of the 32d Army Corps, by Major Vasyl Sadovskyy, under the rubric "First Interview in a New Post"; time and place not given: "For Many, Crimea Is Associated with the Southern Seashore..."]

[Text] Maj. Gen. Oleksandr Kuzmuk was appointed commander of the 32d Army Corps—senior military commander in the Republic of Crimea—at the end of last year

by order of the Ministry of Defense. Our special correspondent in Simferopol met with the commander.

[Sadovskyy] Oleksandr Ivanovich, what is your kith and kin, as the saying goes? What road did you travel to reach your present post?

[Kuzmuk] I come from a military family. I was born in 1954 in Baku. I am a Ukrainian. My biography is the usual biography of soldier. In 1975, I graduated from the Kharkiv Guards Higher Tank Command School [Kharkovskoye gvardeyskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye uchilishche] and in 1983, from the Academy of Armored Troops [Akademiya bronetankovykh voysk]. I commanded a tank platoon, a company, a battalion, a separate tank regiment, a division. I served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and in the Belarus, Moscow, Leningrad, Carpathian, and Odessa military districts. I am married and have two children. My son attends a medical institute, and my daughter is a schoolgirl. My wife is a homemaker.

[Sadovskyy] At one time, service on the sunny peninsula was considered a choice posting, for young lieutenant and gray-haired general alike. Suffice it to say that at the beginning of the seventies, your post was held by Dmitriy Yazov, the next to last minister of defense of the USSR. Those days have sunk into oblivion. Can it be said that only the chosen get posted to Crimea today?

[Kuzmuk] For many, Crimea is associated only with the Southern seashore. After coming here, I got to see the other side of Crimea. You see, the formations and units of the corps are stationed in difficult climatic and geographic conditions—in alpine and steppe regions. From this standpoint, the sunny peninsula looks quite different. As far as the prestige of serving anywhere, including here, is concerned, my attitude is that a soldier's job is the same in any region—wherever his Fatherland orders him to serve.

[Sadovskyy] The alpha and omega of the functioning of any army is its combat training. How is this reflected today in the life of the units and subunits of the army corps?

[Kuzmuk] I have been accustomed since my days as a lieutenant to resolve all matters connected with military discipline and everyday life through combat training. This is the foundation on which the military machine stands. If there is combat training, there will be enthusiasm among the officers and the opportunity to develop their abilities; personal interest in military service will also appear among the soldiers. Experience shows that when combat training is extensive and effective, all other problems such as infringements of regulations [neustavshchina] and desertion disappear. Speaking of the difficulties encountered today in organizing combat training, I would like to note that those commanders who regard combat training of paramount importance manage to find the necessary resources and time and utilize the optimum forms and methods. They conduct lessons and exercises and do so in a comprehensive and

interesting manner. Such commanders include officers Botov and Makavchuk. This year the training process has been organized and is being conducted very intensively. We are devoting particular attention to coordination between subunits.

[Sadovskyy] There is currently a great deal of talk at various levels concerning the presence of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the peninsula. Some are not averse to making political capital on this. What can you tell us on this score?

[Kuzmuk] Yes, there has been an onslaught from some parts of the mass media on our presence here, an onslaught that is purely opportunistic. Moreover, they make use of an expression that is new to us—"demilitarization." Who has been militarizing the Crimea and when? Or the phrase "Ukrainian military formations." Matters concerning the performance of their duties by the formations and units of the Armed Forces in the Crimea lie within the jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief, the president of the country, and the minister of defense. And there are exactly as many troops here as are needed to defend Ukraine.

[Sadovskyy] All the same, by its very nature, this talk of "reductions" offends the military...

[Kuzmuk] The allegations of some politicians that the army is not combat ready, that the anti-aircraft defense system is not in place, upset the officers who are laboring selflessly in this difficult field. I believe that this is simply a tactical move on the part of activists and politicians, who are trying to distract the Crimeans from solving urgent problems. And nothing more. You see, reasonable people are perfectly aware that the cause of Crimea's economic difficulties is by no means due to the presence of the troops.

[Sadovskyy] As we know, today anyone who feels like it dons the mantle of champion of the rights and interests of the people who wear shoulder boards. I would like to hear your opinion...

[Kuzmuk] Naturally, I am following the situation that is developing around us. It is characteristic that most candidates for the office of people's deputy broached military issues in their programs. These issues included the same notion of demilitarization I mentioned above (to be sure, now it has an ecological slant) and military service by Crimean youths to be performed only on the territory of the peninsula. Yet it is quite obvious that these points are purely populist in nature. The fact is that there are documents regarding how many people to recruit and which units—of the Black Sea Fleet and of the land forces. Protocols have been signed on percentages. The majority of politicians are dilettantes in military matters. For example, what does it mean to insist that youths must serve in Crimea? Crimea has no training subunits and units. Consequently, the youths will learn neither a military nor a civilian specialization. They will not become signal men, nor radar specialists, nor operators. In short, they will work only at unskilled

jobs in the army or be doomed to serving in minor posts. Neither their mothers, nor those who stand behind their backs, know this. And so, naturally, serving near your parents appears very appealing at first glance. Although, incidentally, statistics show that this kind of service—and we have bitter experience—has, as a rule, a negative effect. It means unauthorized leaving of units, absences without leave, and other violations.

[Sadovskyy] Do the Crimeans lead in this?

[Kuzmuk] Yes.

[Sadovskyy] Traditionally, the military maintained close contacts with local authorities, enterprises, and institutions. Naturally, it is no easy thing to become settled in one's new position in a few months' time. Nevertheless, Oleksandr Ivanovich, have you found there to be mutual understanding?

[Kuzmuk] It seems to me that the local authorities are more concerned with politics than with the practical things that need to be done. Many problems affecting everyday life have been set aside for the time being. As to establishing contacts, I have done so. For example, I have met privately with President Yuriy Meshkov of Crimea. I asked Yuriy Aleksandrovich to take a look with his own eyes at the situation and conditions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that are billeted in Crimea, with the eyes of a president. I also offered that we solve social problems jointly.

[Sadovskyy] What was Yuriy Meshkov's reaction?

[Kuzmuk] I believe that Yuriy Aleksandrovich met what I said with understanding.

[Sadovskyy] And the last question: What worries you most as the senior military commander in the Republic of Crimea?

[Kuzmuk] The situation that has arisen on the peninsula. Nonetheless, this situation cannot affect the combat readiness and normal activity of the troops to any degree. It is soldier's duty to perform his main task—to study and perfect his professional skills so that he can defend his people in the event of danger. No one has the right to interfere in our performance of this task. It is also essential to give the officers and warrant officers the opportunity to devote themselves fully to their duties without having to glance over their shoulders. We also need normal living conditions, normal conditions for our families, a comfortable life. Everything else will fall into place. We are fully aware of the hardships that the people are suffering. But we are not asking anything extra for ourselves. I would also want the Crimeans to view us not as some sort of monster but as people who are honestly trying to do their duty to their Fatherland.

[Sadovskyy] Thank you for this conversation.

Navy Commander Calls for Implementation of Crimea Agreements

94UM0343A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian*
2 Apr 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, Commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine: "The Way To Eliminate Tensions Is To Implement the Yalta Agreements"]

[Text] Lately, especially after the meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia in Massandra, a concerted effort has been under way in the Russian mass media and in the Black Sea Fleet to inculcate the notion that this Fleet should now be regarded as belonging to Russia and that this issue has already been decided. There is also evidence of concrete steps being taken to make this so. Thus, Russian Army insignia have been issued to the members of some units of the Black Sea Fleet, such as, for example, the naval infantry brigade. This process is continuing: Military personnel serving in the Black Sea Fleet are being made to change into Russian uniforms. Not too long ago, Russia's St. Andrew's flag was raised on auxiliary vessels and some warships in Sevastopol. As a matter of fact, these flags have still not been lowered. This is a violation of Article 7 of the Yalta agreements, which stipulates that the naval insignia of the Black Sea Fleet is defined and approved jointly by the presidents of Ukraine and Russia.

These and many other facts attest that the various conflicts and misunderstandings that emerge result primarily from violations of the Yalta agreements and an unwillingness to abide by these agreements.

Many officials of the Russian Federation and Crimea, as well as the Ministry of Defense and the Naval Forces, tend to view the protocol of intent, signed by President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation in Massandra, as an agreement that is now void, and they insist that all problems be settled solely on the basis of the Massandra documents.

As we know, these documents stated that the Ukrainian side was prepared to consider the Russian Federation's proposals that Ukraine hand over her portion of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia as payment of Ukraine's debt for energy supplies. To consider the possibility, but not to hand over her portion of the Fleet. As to the handing over of the infrastructure, this was out of the question from the beginning—this territory belongs to Ukraine and it will not be handed over. The specific mechanisms of compensation for that part of the Fleet that was to be handed over and the question of Russia's use of naval bases on the territory of Ukraine were to be decided in the course of future negotiations on the basis of recommendations submitted by commissions of experts from both sides. But this question remained unresolved because no mutually acceptable solution was found. We, therefore, return to our earlier positions.

Referring to this problem, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko in a recent interview with *Interfax-Ukraine* stated that future talks on the Black Sea Fleet should be based primarily on the Yalta agreements of 3 August 1992.

According to these agreements, the Black Sea Fleet is to serve as a basis for the creation of the Russian Navy and the Naval Forces of Ukraine. While these are being created, the Fleet remains under the joint command of the presidents of both countries. Thus, during this transitional period, that is until its status is finally decided at the highest state level, this Fleet belongs to both states. Ukraine and Russia have equal rights to the Fleet. The Fleet is bound to defend the interests of both states to an equal degree. One might have thought that the Black Sea Fleet would serve as the basis on which the two sides would achieve mutual understanding and draw closer together.

It is the duty of the command of the Black Sea Fleet and all its command structures to educate its military personnel and its blue- and white-collar workers in a spirit of love and respect for Russia and Ukraine in equal measure and to foster the same attitude towards both. It needs to do everything in its power to ensure that every sailor, sergeant, petty officer (*starshyna*) warrant officer (*michman i praporshchik*), officer, and admiral, every blue- and white-collar worker, is deeply aware that he may not and has neither the legal nor the moral right to disregard the interests of either side by his actions and his conduct, because for the time being he serves both sides. That is why it is sad, to say the least, to hear a high-ranking commander, who should set an example of this attitude, making statements that "the fleet of Ukraine is the fleet of a foreign state." It should have long since been clear that, whatever the ultimate future of the Black Sea Fleet might be, under no circumstances should attitudes that are negative towards Ukraine in even the slightest degree be encouraged in this Fleet. This is the country where this Fleet is based, and the Fleet should comply unconditionally with this country's laws, both during this transitional period and in the future.

That is how it should be. This is in the spirit of the Yalta agreements. And if everyone in the Black Sea Fleet understood this problem thus, there would be no situations that lead to conflicts.

In practice, things are quite different. We know that all agreements reached with respect to the Black Sea Fleet, beginning with the agreement in Dagomys on 23 June 1992, do not nullify but rather supplement one another in defining the legal mechanism for dividing up the Black Sea Fleet. From the beginning, taking into account Russia's interests on the Black Sea, Ukraine has been meticulously fulfilling the obligations she assumed.

However, immediately following the meeting of the two presidents in Dagomys, there began an attempt to artificially exacerbate the problems of the Fleet. First, they

declared the Black Sea Fleet to be the fleet of all the CIS members, charged with the "defense of the southern borders of the Slavic states." Then, rejecting all military theoretical concepts, they declared it to be a strategic fleet, yet forgetting to identify what and whose strategy they had in mind. When it proved impossible to sustain this myth, they began to plant the notion in people's minds through the mass media that the Fleet belonged exclusively to Russia. Moreover, this unwholesome propaganda uproar is supported by raising the Russian flag, adopting Russian insignia, etc.

As a member of the military, it is difficult for me to believe that the Black Sea Fleet command cannot put an end to these excesses. This looks more like an unwillingness to bring order to the situation or a deliberately planned action. The position of the Black Sea Fleet command is further attested by the fact that it does not regard the laws of Ukraine and the orders and directives of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine as documents that must be obeyed, while the orders of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation are carried out unconditionally and fully. The fact that it is subordinated solely to the presidents of Ukraine and Russia and not to the ministries of defense of the two countries is cited by the command of the Black Sea Fleet only when it is refusing to carry out some request made by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Recently, the level of combat readiness of the units and formations of the Black Sea Fleet has been unilaterally raised without informing the Ukrainian side. The Fleet is perfecting amphibious assault operations [*vidpratsyovuyutsya desantni operatsiyi*], dozens of ships are being put out to sea, and some are even being sent to the shores of other states. These large-scale operations are being conducted on Ukrainian territory and on Ukrainian bases without any kind of coordination with Ukraine.

The level of these activities increased markedly during the presidential election in Crimea. This was anything but "innocent military training," as the Black Sea Fleet tried to represent; this was a purposeful and planned action. Especially, inasmuch as it was accompanied by a build-up of social tensions with the help of the mass media.

Strange as it may seem, the Black Sea Fleet conducted itself in this situation as if these events were not developing and taking place on the territory, bases, and in the waters of sovereign Ukraine. It is difficult to imagine the naval forces of any country, based on the territory of another state, behaving in such fashion with complete disregard for the laws and interests of the host country. There is no precedent for such conduct anywhere else in the world. If the Black Sea Fleet acknowledges that it is an operational formation [*operativne formuvannya*] of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, it is completely incomprehensible why such measures are conducted without the knowledge and approval of the Ukrainian side. And it is even more incomprehensible

why the Black Sea Fleet's operations plan is approved in Moscow rather than in both capitals.

Nor can I ignore the following problem. Various mass media are spreading false information that Ukraine is violating the agreements on financing the Black Sea Fleet. Publishing data from the last few months, when Russia's share has indeed been larger than Ukraine's, the authors of these reports and broadcasts deliberately keep silent about the fact that Ukraine financed the Black Sea Fleet one hundred percent through all of 1992 and up to May 1993, and that Russia has not settled its accounts with Ukraine to this day. Ukraine also pays the pensions and provides various social benefits to the military personnel of the Black Sea Fleet. Another fact that has received no publicity is that the Russian side is violating the agreements by financing the Black Sea Fleet through its own commercial structures rather than through the National Bank of Ukraine. That is the reason for the irregularities and delays in issuing payments. This attitude towards people is totally unjustified. As before, the legitimate desire of many servicemen in the Black Sea Fleet to take the loyalty oath to the people of Ukraine, in other words, one of the states to whom the Black Sea Fleet belongs and on whose territory it is based, the home of its sailors and their families, is perceived as a hostile act. There have been instances, by no means isolated, in which such officers and warrant officers [*michmany i praporshchyky*] were dismissed from their posts by order, kicked out by the naval infantry [*vyklydaly za porih sylamy morskoyi pikhoty*], and even discharged into the reserves, declared oath breakers, and so on. Such actions are confirmed by the most recent instance, in which the military personnel at the hospital base in Mykolayiv, who had taken a loyalty oath to the people of Ukraine, were dismissed on the spot from their jobs. Justice was done, however, and these servicemen received protection and were declared to be part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Yet Article 7 of the signed protocol, which regulates the procedure for transferring (assigning) military personnel from one country's armed forces to the forces of another state, stipulates that the parties to the agreement will not hinder the transfer of officers and warrant officers. The Yalta and other agreements provide for mutual obligations on the part of Russia and Ukraine to protect all the rights of servicemen in this respect and allow them complete freedom of choice.

We witnessed a series of other serious situations that disturbed not only members of the military but also the residents of the city. These occurred when housing was being divided between the Black Sea Fleet and the Naval Forces of Ukraine, when the question of supplying heat to the village of Holandiya was being decided, when there were unsanctioned flights by airplanes of the Black Sea Fleet in violation of existing regulations, and when our fuel was seized from the fuel storage base in Sevastopol. It is no secret that the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet take part in various political actions, thereby violating the laws of both Ukraine and Russia. Currently, this type of activity is very much on the rise.

Lately, the Black Sea Fleet command has taken discriminatory steps in providing medical care for the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including Ukraine's Naval Forces.

How do we propose to solve this situation, first and foremost with respect to Sevastopol?

We believe that the structure of the military command in Sevastopol should be changed immediately so that the garrison chief is appointed directly by the president of Ukraine. This should be an admiral or a general, who would take his orders solely from the president of Ukraine and who would be a member of the city's military commission and collegium. The commandants' offices [*komendaturny*], hospital, polyclinics, all building and maintenance services, the military trade facility [*voyentorh*], and the sports and cultural institutions of the Black Sea Fleet and the Naval Forces of Ukraine should be placed under his command.

The services under his command should serve all the military units in Sevastopol but be independent of both the Black Sea Fleet and the Naval Forces of Ukraine. The garrison chief should be in charge of the subunit, the regime service [*sluzhba rezhymu*], and other garrison facilities. Working closely with the administration of internal affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine, he and the structures placed under his command would then be able to safeguard genuine order in the city and prevent any conflicts.

The problems associated with basing ships in Sevastopol are also extremely important. In order to solve all the problems presented by relations between the two military entities, a structure needs to be created that would be independent of both the Black Sea Fleet and the Naval Forces of Ukraine—the Sevastopol Naval Base [SVMB]. On the basis of an agreement, the SVMB could provide basing in Sevastopol for both the Russian and Ukrainian fleets, and, if necessary, also the fleets of other CIS members. It would be the task of the SVMB to provide all the necessary facilities for basing. In our view, this solution would remove the tension between Russia and Ukraine regarding Sevastopol and the basing of their fleets.

The Black Sea Fleet is a structure of the former USSR. Article 1 of the Yalta agreement states that it is to be divided between Russia and Ukraine so that it can serve as a basis on which the Naval Forces of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation will be created on the Black Sea.

In order to establish the Naval Forces of Ukraine, we need bases and funds for both general and specific—i.e. fleet—purposes. This is why it is very important to abide unconditionally by the joint agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on acknowledging and regulating property relations by both sides. The agreement stipulates that all property of the Black Sea Fleet and its bases, both real and movable, is to be used in equal parts (50-50) by both states, Ukraine and Russia.

There is currently a process under way to downsize the Black Sea Fleet, and as part of this process, various material assets are being leased to commercial structures and private individuals. The sale of the transport ship *Donbass* serves as an excellent example of what is happening. The vessel was sold at one-tenth of its real value. The agreement does not permit such actions without the approval of Ukraine's state structures and her Naval Forces. But this approval is not sought, which results in serious losses to Ukraine and her Naval Forces.

This unsupervised process of squandering the material assets of the Black Sea Fleet has been going on for more than two years. This is confirmed by the large number of criminal cases that have been brought. That is why today the question of dividing up the Black Sea Fleet cannot be dealt with without a special preliminary investigation and the necessary preparations. A commission must be formed to determine what assets the Black Sea Fleet had on 6 December 1991, that is, up to the date of the proclamation of sovereignty by Ukraine, and what has happened to these assets since then. The Russian and Ukrainian people should be told the whole truth about the losses they have suffered.

The second stage in the implementation of the Yalta agreements on dividing up the Black Sea Fleet should consist of removing those ships and armaments from combatant service that have completed their service life and putting them up for sale. Only those armaments should be retained that are needed in the new circumstances and that are capable of ensuring that the two fleets are able to carry out their assigned missions.

As part of the third and final stage, it is necessary to divide up what remains, but taking into account the portion that was sold or removed from Ukraine.

Throughout the entire transitional period, that is, until the end of 1995, Sevastopol must remain the main base of both the Naval Forces of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation until Russia solves the problem of creating a base on its own territory.

In conclusion, I would like to encourage those who persist in driving a wedge between Ukraine and the Russian Federation to reread again and again the Yalta and other agreements on the Black Sea Fleet that were reached at the highest interstate level. All these agreements are imbued with a spirit of friendship and mutual respect between the two states and a desire to maintain equal relations between them, founded on the norms and principles of international law.

This example is worthy of emulation. Common sense tells us that this is the only viable approach. This approach also reflects the fraternal spirit and good-neighbor relations which the two people have always maintained. Unquestionably, the implementation of the Yalta agreements will continue to promote this relationship.

The future lies in just such relations, no matter what kind of misunderstandings we are currently experiencing. Those who stand in the way of the development and firm establishment of such relations are doing serious harm to both Russia and Ukraine. And it is difficult to say whom they are harming more. Those who sow the seeds of enmity and distrust between people will never grow and reap a good harvest. For there to be understanding between people, there must be a desire for such understanding.

Institution of Military Chaplains Considered

*94UM0325A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Mar 94 p 1*

[Article by Serhiy Zhurets, under the rubric "A Sociological View": "Chaplains on Active Military Service?.."]

[Text] Young people's attitudes to religion have recently become a topical issue not only in society in general, but also in the Armed Forces. Consequently, the question has arisen of creating the institution of military chaplains in the army. But is there a real need and foundation for this?

The results of a sociological survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine show that the high potential of religion in the army is cited primarily by the clergy themselves. Ninety percent of the clergymen surveyed are in favor of creating the institution of chaplain in the Armed Forces, and 99 percent of representatives of all faiths are ready to begin this work now.

The military, however, takes a more cautious view of this prospect: 25 percent of the officers polled think that the prospects for the institution of chaplains in the army are not significant, 18 percent of the respondents believe that the role of religion in the education of youth should be increased in schools rather than in the army. Nevertheless, nearly one-third of the officers taking part in the survey stressed the need for a greater role for religion in the military environment.

As to personal attitudes to religion among the military, the results of the study conducted in the Armed Forces by the Institute of Sociology show that 50 percent, or half, of the officers regard themselves as nonbelievers, 15 percent of the military respondents describe themselves as not religious, and 35 percent are unable to give a firm answer.

In the case of soldiers and sergeants, it appears that among term servicemen, the level of religiosity decreases with time. Thus, 36 percent consider themselves to be religious at the beginning of their term of service, and only 30 percent still describe themselves as such at the time of discharge. The percentage of those surveyed who count themselves among nonbelievers increases accordingly: 19 percent at the beginning of their service and 27 percent of the soldiers and sergeants completing their terms. This drop is explained as due primarily to the

absence of the institution of chaplain in the army. As a matter of fact, according to reports in the mass media, the Russian Army is planning to appoint one of the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church as the chief chaplain of the army already this year. They are also going to establish a system of educational institutions to train military chaplains.

In the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite the discussions that have been going on about this subject for the past two years, no steps have been taken to introduce the post of military chaplain in the army. It is difficult to say what is causing this delay. Perhaps the fact that the Ukrainian military has more urgent problems to solve at this time—how to feed the troops or where to find the necessary funds. In this situation, God helps those who help themselves, as they say.

Lt-Gen Kobzar on Increasing Discipline

94UM0325B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
25 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, chief of the Main Directorate for Educational and Sociopsychological Work of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Scientific Approaches in the Work of the Organs of Educational and Sociopsychological Work Aim at Increasing the State of Discipline of Military Personnel"]

[Text] The so-called "human factor" plays an important role in any form of activity. It is the positive development of this factor in conditions of military service that is the goal of the organs of Educational and Sociopsychological Work [VSPR]. The ultimate goal of these efforts is to improve the performance by the Armed Forces of their set tasks. The part played by the VSPR organs in attaining this end consists of applying measures of educational and sociopsychological influence to affect such a specific indicator as the moral-psychological state of personnel.

This indicator is characterized primarily by the fact that it is very sensitive to a large number of factors to which a member of the military is subject. Thus, it is an integrating factor in which numerous components are concentrated. These components involve satisfying various human needs, ranging from the biologically programmed need for security and the need to satisfy physiological needs to the highest spiritual needs.

Ultimately, it is this highest level that is decisive in evaluating an individual's moral-psychological state, but this can only be built if there exists a more earthly foundation for it.

Thus, considering the complexity of an individual's needs and that the degree to which each is satisfied in turn affects an individual's moral-psychological state, we need to speak of a very broad spectrum of directions in our work, all of them aimed in one way or another at ensuring a satisfactory moral-psychological state of our

troops. We need to recognize that some of these directions lie beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the VSPR organs.

But there exists a law that is of fundamental importance to us: Just as certain factors affect the moral-psychological state of the troops, this state itself affects the attitude of personnel to all sorts of factors—living conditions, the level of danger to life, restrictions in the sphere of social intercourse, etc. The degree to which spiritual needs are developed and an adequate system for satisfying these needs can compensate even for very significant deprivations that are part and parcel of military-professional activity as a whole and engaging in combat [vedennya boyovykh diy] in particular.

In other words, a military collective, whose moral-psychological state is at a sufficiently high level, is capable of maintaining it at the proper level on its own. We need only professionally ensure this basic level of development. Once it is reached, universal laws of self-regulation of complex systems begin to operate.

Obviously, everything has its limits, and we should know what these limits are and take them into account in our work.

The above reflections may seem theoretical, but only at first glance. We are discussing a very concrete issue—defining the sphere of our practical work and the fundamental methods we must use to accomplish this job.

In the most general sense, let us begin with the premise that the sphere of our work is to influence the moral-psychological state, and that the method by which we exert this influence is by directing sociopsychological processes.

The moral-psychological state is measured by many individual factors, which in their aggregate create a complex system. One such sociopsychological indicator is the state of discipline of personnel [dystsyplinovanist osobovoho skladu], by which we mean the readiness of each individual soldier and the military community as a whole to abide by the accepted standards of military service: Military regulations, orders of commanders and superiors, directions, instructions, etc. Such readiness needs to be formed on both the conscious and unconscious levels of each individual. This is achieved by combining educational, including ideological, work with sociopsychological influence into an interactive system.

Why do we need to speak of such a system? Because the state of discipline is founded on a very wide range of psychophysiological, psychological, and sociopsychological factors. Directly included in the sociopsychological factors are the specific qualities and characteristics of each individual—his patriotism, convictions, devotion to his Fatherland, etc. The system of educational work is specifically designed to form these traits; this is the goal of professional sociologists [narodoznavtsi], the system of the humanitarian training of personnel, and the like.

In other words, those who regard the sphere of sociopsychological factors to be the exclusive sphere of psychologists are very much mistaken.

Unfortunately, at this stage, our educational work is mostly confined to simple imparting of information, whereas it should carry some emotional content, draw the soldier into the deepest strata of his nation's historical memory and the worldview of his ancestors, base itself on subconscious national archetypes. Educational work will then produce significantly better results in increasing the state of discipline of military personnel.

When working to increase the state of discipline of military personnel, it is necessary to keep in mind that this feature is dynamic—depending on various conditions, the level of discipline of each individual soldier can change significantly over a short period of time. In particular, the level of discipline can be easily affected by excessive organizational measures conducted by superiors, as well as many other things that can produce a sense of inner dissatisfaction with the situation in which a person finds himself in military service. This dissatisfaction can activate the corresponding psychological mechanisms, but it will require purely organizational rather than sociopsychological measures.

There is a direct link between the state of discipline of personnel as a sociopsychological indicator and the general level of military discipline. Increasing military discipline is the common goal of virtually all structures of military leadership; every official bears his own measure of responsibility for this discipline. But the foundation of military discipline in the Armed Forces is the state of discipline of personnel.

Can military discipline be maintained at a more or less satisfactory level if the state of discipline of personnel remains low?

I should note that that was exactly what we always tried to do by directing all our efforts at increasing military discipline not by forming a sociopsychological characteristic like a state of discipline in personnel, but by creating conditions in which an undisciplined soldier—that is, one psychologically prepared to violate discipline—would be compelled to abide by accepted standards because of increased supervision, increased exactingness, etc.

Let us be frank—we are not satisfied with the quality of our contingent of conscripts. Every professional activity is based on the possession of certain individual psychological characteristics by the person performing the activity, and military service is no exception. There exists a so-called professional profile [profesiohrama] of a soldier, which defines the necessary individual psychological characteristics required for normal service. Those individual psychological characteristics that are associated with the state of discipline of a soldier are an essential component of the professional profile and must be studied by experts in the military commissariats in the process of conscription.

Thus, the sociopsychological study of a conscript's personality plays an important role in preventing violations of military discipline. This study anticipates an assessment of the candidate's moral qualities, the motives underlying his conduct and activity, his military professional orientation, the way he interacts and behaves in a group, and other individual psychological qualities.

The sociopsychological study of individual traits cannot rely solely on information obtained from tests; it must be based on an analysis of the formation and development of an individual.

By analyzing an individual's biography, the conditions in which he was reared and his personality developed, it is possible to obtain information about his professional interests, moral principles, character traits, distinguishing features of his emotional makeup, organizational skills, etc.

We take into account that the development of personality is affected by the composition of the family, the way in which family members interact, the family's social and living conditions, and the interests and paramount requirements of the family as a whole.

Viewing moral qualities as stable features of an individual's conscious mind, which are reflected to a certain degree in his character, during the process of professional selection, the social psychologist makes use of the entire arsenal of psychological methods and methodologies. Based on the results of this analysis, a conclusion is reached regarding the probability of the subject's success or failure to perform under the conditions involved in military service and steps to prevent possible deviations in conduct are recommended.

But what can we do in today's circumstances in the event that this prognosis is negative? After all, this individual will still end up in the Armed Forces. The present situation does not allow us to create a professional army, in which recruitment into the military would be conducted on a competitive basis. At present, we take everyone. As a result, we frequently encounter a situation in which we are forced—metaphorically speaking—to make a musician out of a deaf man. To continue the same metaphor, all that we can do under the circumstances is not entrust the "deaf man" with a "violin" but with something closer to a "drum."

If we attain our goal of increasing the state of discipline of personnel, will this mean an automatic increase in the level of military discipline in general? It should be clearly understood that although there is a direct link between the state of discipline of personnel and overall military discipline, the state of discipline of subordinates is not always enough to compensate for miscalculations in general organizational matters, problems in creating the necessary conditions, etc.

Another thing that educators must recognize is that although the state of discipline of personnel is a sociopsychological indicator, this indicator, like the level of

military discipline in general, is also affected by factors other than sociopsychological ones. Therefore, the deputy commander in charge of educational and sociopsychological work cannot ignore the wide range of issues that in one way or another involve the interests and needs of the individual. This approach is also reflected in the Temporary Regulations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The practical methods used by the VSPR organs in the sphere that involves the needs and underlying motives of conduct of personnel can vary widely, depending on specific conditions and practical possibilities. The temporary failure to satisfy one need can be compensated by satisfying another need, which a military psychologist and educator can ensure in a timely fashion. The fact that there are certain restrictions in military life can be accepted more readily by personnel if the system of motives is influenced in a proper professional manner. In certain conditions, the professional responsibility of a VSPR official may require candidly telling a superior about the range of possibilities in educational work and sociopsychological measures. It is, after all, possible to create a situation in which a person will basically refuse to execute every single order unless hypnotized to do so.

The VSPR organs must anticipate the dynamics of the moral-psychological state of personnel under the influence of the system of dominant factors and respond in timely manner to potential problems.

Work that is oriented on a conceptual approach to increasing military discipline by VSPR organs through influencing the state of discipline of personnel must be based on a scientifically founded sociopsychological system as an adjunct of military service. Allow me to list the main requirements of such a system.

It should provide for unified algorithms of activity on the part of VSPR professionals, taking into account the specific features of the sociopsychological characteristics of soldiers at various stages in their service, the psychological laws of group dynamics in military subunits, the laws underlying the impact of factors characteristic of military service on the individual at various stages of military service, and the like.

The system of the sociopsychological adjunct of military service must resemble a production flow chart [tekh-nichna karta] of the work of VSPR professionals, which takes into account the actual level of training of military specialists by providing several alternative methods of work. There should be a base variant, which could be introduced immediately at the level that we have today, as well as alternatives involving a higher level, which, in addition to the basic measures that use the popular methodologies "Prohnoz," KOS-KOR, sociometrics, and some others, would also provide for the use of a higher degree of psychological manipulation.

An understanding of all these elements focuses our attention on our scientific base. What kind of base do we have today? We do not have a single up-to-date textbook

on psychology for the military that would meet world standards in this field. In fact, we have no Ukrainian handbooks at all. Almost nothing is being done to train our own scientific cadres for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the fields of educational work and meeting the sociopsychological needs of personnel in the districts and branches of the Armed Forces.

Another problem that we encounter in introducing modern scientific approaches in the work of the VSPR organs is the need that they be based on what I would call an adequate level of civilization in both society at large and the military environment. Our sociopsychological measures must be based on a certain level of understanding on the part of all officials of the specific features of our professional activity and on a proper attitude towards this work, on a readiness to introduce modern social techniques and "sophisticated" methods of influencing the moral-psychological state of our troops. This requires that we provide proper training not only for our specialists, but also for our entire officer corps, starting from the time they are attending military educational institutions.

All this lies in the future. But it requires that we take certain practical steps immediately. We need to encourage the directors of the Scientific-Research and Methodological Center of the Main Directorate of Educational and Sociopsychological Work of the Ministry of Defense to devote very serious attention to this matter. I expect them to provide teaching manuals for the forces that have been prepared on a modern scientific level and a detailed sociopsychological system of support in military service, which we need to begin introducing in stages in the Armed Forces starting now. In addition, we are waiting for a prospective program [perspektyvna prohrama] developed jointly with the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Military Education for providing officers in command cadres with basic sociopsychological training.

Any assessment of the contribution of the VSPR organs to increasing military discipline must be based on an assessment of their actual contribution to raising the level of the state of personnel discipline—i.e., what concrete steps were taken towards this end. But this general assessment needs to be made more specific. It is not enough to simply add up the number of measures that were applied in evaluating the activity of VSPR organs. We have something different in mind.

First, all measures used in educational work and sociopsychological support must be combined into an integrated system, in which everything is interconnected. In other words, in order to assess the work of the VSPR organs, it is necessary to establish the degree of conceptual uniformity in the measures applied.

Second, it is necessary to assess the justification for every measure and its specific objective. The specialist must understand clearly why at any given moment he applies a specific measure and to a specific extent.

Third, each measure applied by the VSPR organs must be assessed in terms of how well it meets professional standards, as well as how effective it is in accomplishing its designated purpose.

Fourth, it is necessary to take into consideration to what degree the measures applied by the VSPR organs reflect all the directions of our work, beginning with the methodological and experimental spheres and ending with that of individual education.

Fifth, VSPR professionals must possess thorough and comprehensive information about the real state of affairs in their sphere.

This set of indicators of the activity of the organs of the VSPR makes it possible to give an objective and integral assessment of the quality of this work.

Simplifying the system of assessment, reducing it to merely quantitative indicators, cannot be allowed, because this will inevitably lead to a surrogate level in practice.

Another vitally important question concerns the ways in which the VSPR organs make a practical contribution to the overall assessment of the state of military discipline as a basis for planning further work in this field.

Only those categories that belong to the sociopsychological field can be subject to sociopsychological analysis. With respect to military discipline, this category is the state of discipline of personnel. Thus the role of the VSPR organs in the overall assessment of the state of military discipline is to conduct a thoroughgoing professional assessment of the state of discipline of personnel, which must be based on:

- a general statistical record of violations of military discipline, which are kept by the military staffs;
- a legal analysis of the situation, which is conducted by the legal specialists in the VSPR organs;
- an understanding of the social processes in the Armed Forces arrived at with the help of sociological studies;
- a deep understanding of the psychological and psychophysiological factors that operate in military subunits and affect the level of discipline;
- the results of a study specifically designed to analyze the level of the state of discipline of personnel in units and subunits using the methods of sociopsychological research. We have already discussed how this can be done.

Thus, only a scientific approach, based on an analysis of the daily activity of the VSPR organs, can bring positive results in the activity of professional educators and promote a high level of discipline among personnel.

Ministry of Defense Officials Observe Air Force Training

Radetsky, Air Force Leadership at Vinnytsya
94UM0345A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
31 Mar 94 p 1

[Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Minister of Defense at Air Force Training"]

[Text] As we reported earlier, Air Force command staff training is continuing in accordance with the plan for combat training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Defense Minister General of the Army Vitaliy Radetsky visited the headquarters of the Air Force of Ukraine in Vinnytsya. As the person ultimately in charge of training, the minister heard reports from Lt. Gen. Volodymyr Antonets, the commander of the Air Force, Maj. Gen. Yuriy Petrov, chief of staff of the Air Force, and the chiefs of directorates and services and set them the task of working out how the country's Air Force will be used in strategic defense operations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Vitaliy Radetsky stressed the need for more thoroughly working out the combat missions in such training exercises, because they offer an opportunity for commanders at all levels to attain theoretical and practical skills in leading troops.

The chief of Ukraine's War Office visited the helicopter regiment stationed in Vinnytsya. Here, Vitaliy Radetsky acquainted himself with the everyday life of personnel and the conditions in which the helicopter troops carry out their military duty. It was evident that the members of this unit and their families are experiencing considerable social and everyday hardships. Despite these difficulties, the aviators are executing the tasks they have been assigned. This was confirmed by the efficient performance of the pair on duty: On the defense minister's command, the helicopters rose into the air, significantly exceeding the accepted standard.

The main subject discussed during the meeting of the defense minister with the regiment personnel was the need to focus attention on the problems of the army and to begin solving them as quickly as possible.

Bizhan at Air Exercises

94UM0345B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya, correspondent of NARODNA ARMIYA: "The Exercises Have Been Completed. Training Is Continuing"]

[Text] As reported earlier, Ukrainian Air Force command staff exercises were conducted from 29 to 31 March. After these were completed, Col. Gen. Ivan Bizhan conducted a detailed analysis of the exercises and

summed up their results at the Main Headquarters of the Air Force, which is located in Vinnytsya.

In his speech to the Air Force leadership, he noted, first and foremost, that although the global threat of war breaking out in the world no longer exists, there is an increased threat of local regional conflicts flaring up. To prevent this, it is necessary not only to have Armed Forces, but also to maintain them in a combat ready state. This is why it is essential to conduct a wide variety of exercises and training.

The main goal of the unilateral two-stage command staff exercises that were conducted on the base of the Directorate of the Air Force of Ukraine, the air army, and the groups of long-distance and transport aviation was to hone the professional skills of commanders at all levels, as well as to improve coordination of action among the organs of the directorate and with the Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces [PPO] and the aviation [component] of the Naval Forces.

Col. Gen. Ivan Bizhan made a point of stressing that no neighboring state was imagined in the role of the enemy during the exercises. The enemy forces were called "Western" and "Southwestern." These were imaginary states and their armed forces. Standing against them were the "Eastern" forces—i.e., Ukraine and her Armed Forces.

The "legend" or condition underlying the command staff exercise was one possible variant of the eruption of an armed conflict and the launching of military actions against our state. The exercise anticipated military action on a rather wide front, up to five massive air strikes, amphibious landings, etc.

The "Eastern" forces developed plans for committing the Air Force to action and conducting a defensive air operation in three phases.

How well did they succeed? In his speech, the deputy minister of defense noted that, on the whole, the exercise had been performed according to the established guidelines. The plan for the conduct of the military actions, which had been presented to the chief of training, General of the Army Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy, by the commander of the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Volodymyr Antonets, generally met the standards of the task that had been set. The solutions implemented by the commanders of the air armies and aviation groups were also well-considered and appropriate to the simulated war conditions. However, a number of shortcomings were noted in the performance of the command structures.

The higher the command or staff, the more clearly defined and coordinated must be their activities. This was not always the case, noted Col. Gen. Ivan Bizhan. He pointed out the shortcomings in the performance of specific officers. At the same time, he named the officers who perform their military duties conscientiously. Col. Leonid Podnosov, chief of intelligence of the 14th Air

Army, exhibited a particularly high standard of professionalism and the ability to organize activity during the exercise in a timely and productive manner.

These exercises demonstrated that problems can crop up where there should be no problems whatsoever—in the system of relaying commands, battle plan instructions, and orders. These were sometimes late in reaching those who had to execute them.

It was also noted that in planning such exercises, it is necessary to take into account the real state of affairs in the forces and the possible options for action in the event of a military threat. This will force commanders to prepare their subordinates with greater clarity of purpose in their everyday military training. And to create military structures in peacetime that in the face of a military threat will require the least number of structural changes, basing redeployment, and changes in stationing locations. It is necessary to create universal air bases at military airfields to service all types of aircraft, both in peacetime and in wartime.

Other conclusions were also drawn on the basis of these exercises. The most important of these for future work, as the deputy defense minister noted, is that the training of staff officers must be significantly improved. This requires implementing the principle whereby a superior trains his subordinates.

In conclusion, Col. Gen. Bizhan stated that he was confident that the military aviators would succeed in overcoming all the difficulties of this transitional period now that Lt. Gen. Volodymyr Antonets had assumed command over them, because their new commander has a great deal of experience, energy, ability, and all the other qualities necessary for working selflessly and productively.

Radetskyy at Myrhorod Air Division Headquarters

*94UM0345C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 Apr 94 p 1*

[Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Problems of Aviators Will Be Solved Expeditiously"]

[Text] On 2 April of this year, General of the Army Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy paid a planned working visit to Myrhorod, the headquarters of a Ukrainian Air Force division.

In order to gain a real understanding of the situation among the military and the problems facing the people wearing shoulder boards, the chief of the War Office [kerivnyk viyskovoho vidomstva] invited Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov to accompany him on this visit.

Together they inspected the airfield and the aviators' military town, visited the barracks, the soldiers' mess, and the military trade store. Virtually everything was of

interest to the minister and the deputy prime minister—the conditions in which personnel live, whether the store carries fresh bread, what the soldiers and officers are fed, and whether they have all the necessities.

The representatives of the government also visited the homes of some aviators and met with the residents of the military town. There is no shortage of problems here. The deputy prime minister and the defense minister promised to solve some of these problems expeditiously. Thus the officers and soldiers [o/s] would receive their pay in the next few days, and according to the defense minister's instruction, the pharmacy in the town will be opened in a week's time.

In order to check the combat readiness and training of the aviators, General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskyy issued an order commanding the air units on duty to fly. The section commander, Maj. Mykhaylo Moroz, and Senior Airman Volodymyr Kovpakov performed their task efficiently. The handsome SU-27s they flew rose into the air exceeding the accepted standard, and the fighter pilots performed their training exercise successfully. The defense minister thanked them for doing a good job.

Such visits to the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine enable us to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation in the military and persuade us of the need to focus our attention on army problems.

Fuel, Material-Technical Problems Constrain Flight Training

Fuel Shortages Limit Flight Time

94UM0344A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
29 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Lt. Col. Nykyfor Lysytsya, special correspondent of NARODNA ARMIYA: "Apropos the Results of the Academic Year. The Word 'Flier' Comes From the Term 'To Fly'"]

[Text] There are lately more and more officers who have only rarely lifted their airplanes into the skies during the past academic year. The 14th Air Army alone numbers 62 such pilots. An additional 74 young pilots have each spent only five to six hours in the air. The average flight time among the air fighters amounts to a little over 20 hours each.

Much has already been said about this state of affairs. Let me, therefore, confine myself to noting that the main reason for this is a lack of fuel. The so-called rotation of flight personnel—in other words, transferring officers from one unit to another—has also played a negative role in this. The situation is difficult.

What is the solution? After all, we do not anticipate a significant improvement in the provision of material-technical supplies for flights in the coming academic year.

These issues have been raised on many occasions at various conferences, seminars, and meetings in the air army, which is under the command of Lt. Gen. Viktor Lyashenko. Working together, they arrived at certain conclusions and drew up some specific recommendations.

To begin with, they decided to ensure that the best trained specialists—the airmen first class and the airmen-snipers—maintain their proficiency level. This solution is quite justified. The combat capability and combat readiness of the air units and subunits depend on these people. As a rule, they can also serve as instructors, as so-called auxiliary instructors, for those who care about their professional training. In addition, an airman first class needs significantly fewer hours in the air to maintain his skills than an airman second class, and fewer still than an airman third class. This also means that they use much less airplane fuel, which is in short supply.

Hence, the main combat crews on airplanes and helicopters are composed, as a rule, of airmen with the highest qualification. They fly more flights. And they are first to be issued fuel.

That is how things were done this year. But it will be necessary to abandon this principle next year. First, the number of airmen first class is growing smaller—many are being discharged into the reserves. Some are losing their ranking because of other objective reasons. Second, a large gap is developing between the different strata of flight personnel. Those who were ranked second and third class are now lagging behind and losing their qualification. Metaphorically speaking, the forest is being left without new growth, and this will inevitably produce negative results.

That is why they decided to include airmen second class and even airmen third class in the main fighter crews—to enable them to fly and improve their skills. But they will select only promising officers for this, born aviators, as they say, whom a minimum number of flight hours will suffice not only to maintain their qualification, but also to raise it.

And what will happen to those who are not included in the main combat crews?

This year they were assigned to the training regiments, where flights are conducted on L-39's. This, at least, allowed them to retain the level of airman second or third class.

They plan to continue this practice during the next academic year as well. However, the leadership of the Air Force needs to take the necessary steps to organize this form of additional training at the proper level. There were times when airmen who had been assigned to fly were ignored by practically everybody. As a result, the issue of raising qualifications did not arise, even though considerable sums of money were spent.

Today, we cannot afford not to think and not to be concerned about the future of military aviation. And this future lies with the lieutenants graduating this year from military schools. They do not yet have a class qualification. They also have much less flight experience. Suffice it to say that their graduation from school was postponed for a month because of a shortage of fuel for scheduled training.

The regiments to which they have been assigned are also hard up for airplane fuel. The lieutenants cannot expect to make solo flights in the cabins of fighter planes in the near future. Consequently, the leadership of the air army proposed to gather all the young pilots into one training regiment, assign experienced instructors to this unit, and organize further training for these airmen. This will enable them to raise their qualification to airman third class. Then, if they are not assigned to the main combat crews, it will be possible to maintain them as a reserve of class specialists [klasni spetsialisty].

It is essential that the proposals put forward above find official support from the Ministry of Defense. The creation of a training regiment composed of lieutenants and other organizational measures deserve serious attention, as well as the allocation of funds. In the end, these costs will inevitably prove to have been justified. After all, this is a matter of investing funds in a cause that is vital to the state.

Limited Flying Impedes Pilot Skill Level

94UM0344B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
4 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Senior Lt. Yuriy Povkh, under the rubric "The National Army": "Clipped Wings, or Why Have Innocent Young Pilots Proved Guilty?"]

[Text] Breaking the silence of the frosty winter morning, the silver-winged fighter planes thundered over the town. Its residents, who have lately grown unaccustomed to regular flights, watched in amazement as the ferociously elegant MIGs performed steep 360-degree turns. A flight day was beginning.

This was a day out of the ordinary for the pilots of the fighter regiment. For some, this meant the opportunity to rise once again into the skies, feel themselves masters in the air, see for themselves how obediently their fearsome military machines were behaving—these marvels of late twentieth-century engineering. Yet, the usual bravura intonation was lacking in the words "out of the ordinary": One could hear undisguised bitterness and sadness in the voices of the pilots when the talk turned to flying. Why? Because they compared the flights they had just completed to offering a drop of water to someone dying of thirst in the desert.

That is why the pilots took extreme care as they lifted their winged machines into the sky. Moreover, the weather that day did not give them much joy: Dense

snow that hid the horizon alternated with brilliant sunshine. At times, this produced a kind of "cocktail"—a term used by the aviators to describe difficult weather conditions—over the airfield and the designated flying zone.

Nonetheless, none of this prevented Col. V. Yavorsky, the commander of the regiment, and his subordinates from demonstrating their excellent flying skills. Thus, Maj. Valeriy Nedbay, the senior navigator, performed his assignment with distinction by executing a difficult flight, hitting his target, and landing with the help of stand-by controls. An equal degree of proficiency was exhibited by Maj. Vyacheslav Kamchatnyy and Maj. Mykola Onyshchenko, captains Andriy Lyashenko, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Vitaliy Bryzhadov, and others. In other words, they showed that "there was still powder in the old powder horns."

Unfortunately, however, many pilots, who are regarded as young, were not given the opportunity to rise into the skies. All they could do was watch their colleagues from the ground.

Captain Viktor Ostapenko was one of those who remained on the ground. As it turned out, this had nothing to do with his age. He has been an officer for five years. Under the earlier standards, he would have been wearing the insignia of airman second class for the last two years. But this has not happened. This is not because of any failing on Viktor's part. Nor can we talk of failings on the part of any of the other pilots; we need only recall that they are often called peculiar because of their fanatical devotion to the skies. It is the chronic scarcity of fuel that has clipped the wings of Ostapenko and his colleagues, (he is hardly alone).

As a result, the airman has meager flight experience. During all of last year, he spent only four hours in the air. An absurd figure, to say the least. But even this figure is misleading, because Capt. Ostapenko spent the lion's share of this time on routine testing of the level of his proficiency. Every fighter pilot has to undergo such testing during the year. This is hardly a matter of improving flying skills; it is a matter of not losing the level of qualification already attained.

For the sake of comparison, let me say that a pilot in the U.S. Air Force, who has flown fewer than 50 hours in any year, is regarded as potentially accident-prone and is kept under watchful observation by his command.

Obviously, it would be wrong to say that everything has been allowed to drift in the regiment and that good bread is being wasted on the pilots. Clearly, the command of the regiment does not currently have the forces and means that are at the disposal of the armies of developed countries. Consequently, the unit is conducting systematic instruction closely linked with combat training. The pilots are improving their theoretical knowledge and tempering their bodies physically. (Most often, this consists of cross-country races [kros], which, through the irony of fate, are conducted on the landing strip).

Instruction on the shooting range is not at all rare these days. In a word, Col. Yavorsky is doing everything in his power to ensure that the regiment assigned to him should remain a fighting unit.

But you must admit that the pilot's job is to fight in the air and not on the ground. What will be the consequences of this kind of "freeze" in the training of air personnel? I heard the answer to this question from Lt. Col. Mykola Horyachov, senior airman and inspector of the rayon directorate of the anti-aircraft defense force [PPO]. Commenting on the existing situation, he said:

"At present, there has been a virtual halt in the training of young pilots in the regiment for reasons that we all know. Small wonder, therefore, that potentially promising officers, who have served for five to seven years, are openly admitting that they are afraid to fly. 'If things go on this way, there will be more takeoffs than landings,' say the pilots. And they are right. Because the making of a professional pilot has always been closely linked with the mentorship or more experienced pilots. Unfortunately, we do not have this today. It is always easier to destroy something than to build it. The 'old men' will retire in a few years, and the young lads will not even have an opportunity to feel the safety of wings. Because the experience amassed in bits and pieces by more than one generation of fighter pilots will remain unutilized. There is absolutely no doubt that all of this will have a negative impact on the future fate of the aviation of Ukraine's anti-aircraft defense component [PPO]."

A pessimistic prognosis, as you can see. One would very much like to believe that Lt. Col. M. Horyachov's words are not prophetic. But reality dictates its own logic. A closer examination reveals that the problem is not solely confined to the fuel shortage. The technical condition of the airplanes themselves is also of concern to everybody. First and foremost, the condition of the so-called "sparok", which are used to train pilots and to refresh their skills. There are only two such planes left in the regiment. A third has been sent for repairs to Russia, and, it appears, that is the end of that trainer airplane. The regiment cannot perform these intricate repairs on its own. Our eastern neighbor also makes new spare parts and motors. How are these training fighter planes, which require continual maintenance because they are the most frequently used, to be kept in the proper technical condition? In other words, even if fuel were to become available, regular flights might not be possible.

It might be possible to partly maintain pilot training at the necessary level by using flight simulators. But this, too, is not as simple as it sounds. These expensive machines were left at the previous location where the regiment was stationed, and now the lack of funds makes it difficult to transport them to the regiment's new headquarters. They cannot be transported like bricks, because they are delicate machines, filled with electronics. Moreover, the need for repeated assembly will inevitably have an adverse effect on the future use of these flight simulators.

And so, like Mohammed who was forced to go to the mountain when it failed to come to him, the pilots now travel hundreds of kilometers to "fly" the flight simulators; moreover, spending large sums of both the state's and their own money to do so.

But the flight simulators are not the most serious problem to have resulted from the redeployment of the regiment. The move itself shook the whole system of the aviators' lives to its very foundations, as they say. Specifically because of the relocation, some dozen and a half pilots, most of whom held command posts, have left the regiment. And those who remained were adversely affected by this "experiment." It "ran over them" like a steam roller. The equipment was transported, but apparently no one gave much thought to the people. The following statistics tell the whole sad story: 40 percent of the officers and warrant officers have apartments at their former place of service. And those who had no apartments to begin with have sent their families to live with their parents. They themselves live in barracks.

Recently, still another problem was added to all the problems that the regiment already has: Complete disarray in providing the regiment with financial security. Not once have the aviators received their pay on time at their new location. The delays have lasted up to a month. On the day that I visited the regiment, the delay had substantially exceeded even this period of time. And there is no one to complain to that you have a family and children, who need to eat every day. As to the transfer pay that is to be paid when a serviceman is stationed to a new location, close to 40 percent of the officers and warrant officers simply never got it. By now, the galloping inflation has "eaten up" this money.

Small wonder that in this difficult situation requests for discharge from the Armed Forces have come down like autumn leaves. Close to two dozen pilots (!) and thirty engineers and technicians have expressed their desire to leave the army. The pilots are not deterred even by the fact that they are unlikely to find a job in their specialty in civilian life. Currently, civil aviation's own pilots do not know what to do with themselves. Moreover, it is no easy matter to retrain a fighter ace into a civilian slow-speed cruiser [tykhokhid]. The difference between these two kinds of flying equipment is approximately as great as between a Formula-one racing car and the Zaporozhets.

Nevertheless, those who have decided to leave the army are resolved to do so at any price. Some are even prepared to give up their pensions—their rightful reward for service—just as long as they are allowed to leave. But the highest staff does not act on the requests of these officers, and, in my view, the given situation was very aptly described by one of those who wants to leave:

"It is as if we had been sold into slavery—they neither allow us to serve nor to leave."

Incidentally, the overwhelming majority of officers who have expressed a desire to be discharged into the reserves

are airmen first class—the army's golden fund, as it were, the mentors of the young. How can one help but recall the words of Lt. Col. Horyachyy?

They say that the pilots who do not have the opportunity to fly in their units will soon be sent to flight schools. There they will once again pilot training airplanes. Undoubtedly, even this desperate step could keep the situation under control for a while. But for how long? Will this provide a fundamental solution to the problem, considering that these schools are themselves maintained on "starvation rations"?

It seems to me that the processes that are currently under way in the aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are becoming more and more reminiscent of a well-planned diversion, aimed at depriving the country of its fighter aviation in the shortest possible time. Judging by the statements of some people's deputies, they still fail to understand (three years later) the need for an army, regarding it as no more than an obedient supplier of military equipment that can be sold to fill some of the holes in the state budget.

To be sure, equipment can be replaced in time (although this, too, is very problematical), but what to do about the people who when asked on the questionnaire "Will you serve in the Armed Forces if the present situation remains unchanged?" unanimously answered "No!"

A pilot must fly. Always, the harshest punishment for a pilot was to be kept from flying. Today, through no fault of their own, most flight personnel have been punished in just such a way. And now the once most combat capable regiment, which has glorious military traditions and a huge collective store of experience, is being forced to give up one by one the high positions it had won. Just a short time ago, its pilots were the visiting card, as it were, of all our Armed Forces. There is hardly a high-ranking guest to whom they did not demonstrate their skills—in the skies of Ukraine, as well as abroad!

Here is but one situation that I witnessed. I recall the outburst of astonishment from those present in the fall of last year at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Kiev, when the fighter pilots emerged out of a thick fog and streaked like lightning above the steep banks of the Dnieper. On that occasion, they did what few aviators are able to do...

I firmly believe that pilots are born. Naturally, you can teach a person to operate a complicated fighting machine and to transport large shipments, but you cannot instill a love of the sky in an individual. This requires an inner passion of the soul, a vocation—a strong amalgam of strength, courage, and will. The celebrated French writer and professional pilot, Antoine de St. Exupery, was a thousand times right when he wrote that he would give all the gold in the world to experience just one flight.

Apart from this purely spiritual aspect, there is also an economic one. This, too, cannot be overlooked.

Have you ever considered how much the state spends to train a single pilot? It turns out that it spends the same amount as to train twenty physicians! And all these funds come from the pockets of taxpayers. That being the case, should we treat our pilots in such a thoughtless manner and clip their wings?

Flight Safety Examined in Light of Training Constraints

94UM0346A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya, special correspondent of NARODNA ARMIYA: "Flight Safety: The Desirable and the Possible"]

[Text] In most cases, man's first attempts to leave the earth and fly above it like a bird for even a short while ended in tragedy. Thus, from the very birth of aviation, the problem of flight safety assumed paramount importance for those who tried to conquer the skies. It was, after all, not enough to rise into the air; just as important was the ability to land safely without injury either to self or flying machine. This was the goal towards which inventors, designers, and pilots worked—all those who were fascinated by the idea of "wings." And as history confirms, as aviation engineering and science developed and piloting skills were mastered, the probability of accidents during flights fell hundreds of times, and it became much safer to rise into the air.

Still, even with our modern aviation equipment, highly perfected means for ensuring the safety of flights, and thoroughly equipped airfields, tragic accidents, or flight incidents as aviators call them, or even catastrophes, do happen, unfortunately. Consequently, flight safety remains and will probably continue to remain perhaps the most important concern of aviators, and especially of military aviators.

To some extent, objective circumstances have made this problem even more acute for the Air Force of Ukraine. Some of these reasons were discussed at the conference on flight safety recently held by the 14th Air Army.

To begin with, it was noted that the shortage of fuel and lubricants, spare parts, and funds has caused the intensity of flight training to decrease substantially, and the expertise of pilots in the principal categories of training, especially in difficult weather conditions [SUM] and at night, to drop. The expertise of the flight operations groups (HKP) has decreased for the same reason. A significant number of specialists have been discharged into the reserves. They have been replaced by new people who lack sufficient experience in flight operations and control.

Objective difficulties in obtaining spare parts and machinery for communications equipment and for the electronic support of flights and for airfield equipment

are reducing the reliability with which these function; and this, too, has a negative impact on flight safety. Aviators are also plagued by other problems with respect to material-technical supply. However, despite everything, last year the 14th Air Army had no serious flight incidents—at least, there were no catastrophes. There is no point in discussing at length how they managed this. The most important thing, after all, is to hope that disasters continue to pass by the aviators this year as well. Relying on God alone is hardly enough; concrete steps need to be taken to ensure flight safety. One such measure was the conference we have already mentioned. The goal of the conference was to prevent the level of flight safety from dropping in our difficult times by having experienced pilots and other specialists prepare specific recommendations on the basis of a detailed analysis of flight incidents and their causes.

Sad though it may be, in matters pertaining to preventing accidents, aviators learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of others. And, as we know, it is better to learn from the mistakes of others. Hence, in their collectives, they analyze each accident, catastrophe, and the causes of each in considerable detail. This was also done at the conference.

A detailed analysis of the flight safety record of the formation's units during the last five years was conducted. There were four flight incidents in the air army during this period—one catastrophe, one accident, and two incidents in which planes were damaged. Four men died, an MI-24 helicopter and a MIG-29 were lost, and two other planes were damaged: an AN-12 and a MIG-29. A few other tragic air accidents occurred in the units that were recently added to the 14th Air Army. As we can see, there is plenty of negative experience here from which to learn.

What are the main causes of accidents and catastrophes? The results of the investigations conducted in the case of each accident confirm that the leading causes are pilot errors resulting from an inadequate level of professional training on the part of fliers. Moreover, the majority of accidents involved young specialists who held the post of airman or senior airman.

In addition to the leading causes of flight incidents, the other subjects considered included shortcomings in the organization and ensuring [zabezpechennya] of flights and in the performance of personnel in the flight operations groups, who were responsible to some degree for the negative outcome in each specific case.

Here is what happened in each specific instance. Senior Lt. Airman V. Burskyy, flying at a low altitude in an assigned area, after performing a 360-degree banked turn, decided to change the sweep angle of the wing. As a result, he turned his attention away from his altitude and the wing of his plane caught the tops of the trees. The result was a crash.

On 16 May 1991, Senior Airman Lt. I. Halchenkov was flying a MIG-29. His mission was to carry out an air

"battle" with a low-altitude slow-flying air target. The pilot found himself in an emergency after completing his fourth attack. At a height of a little over a kilometer, he failed to pay careful attention to the indicators on his instrument panel and lost lateral control. The pilot became confused and, persuaded that the airplane was not responding to the control stick, he ejected. The plane crashed into the ground...

The most typical accident caused by shortcomings in the organization and flight operations control occurred on 24 January 1989. The crew of a MI-24 helicopter led by Capt. S. Roztorhuyev was performing an uncomplicated flight exercise. One minute and 40 seconds after takeoff, at an altitude of 220 meters, the helicopter, banking to the right and increasing its angle of descent, hit the ground and burned.

The direct cause of the catastrophe was the loss by the commander of the crew of his sense of direction as he suddenly found himself in the clouds, because he had insufficient training to fly in such conditions. In addition, he had turned away his attention to visually search for a second helicopter flying alongside. But the principal cause was a series of serious violations and shortcomings in the organization and control of flights, which, unfortunately, became evident only during the investigation following the crash. Capt. S. Roztorhuyev came to the regiment from Afghanistan and did not begin to fly until three months later. Such a long gap is inadmissible. The number of actual flights required to restore lost piloting skills before being put into active service had been cut in half. Before the day of the catastrophe, the pilot had not refreshed his training to operate a helicopter at night or in difficult weather conditions. As a specialist third class, he had virtually no experience in this kind of flying. Moreover, the commander of the regiment had scheduled flights in normal weather conditions, whereas by then the conditions were in fact difficult and growing worse.

The flight operations officer on the landing ground, Maj. P. Zhreleyev, lacking adequate professional training, did not apply safety measures in the zone for which he was responsible in time. When the situation in the air became an emergency, he lost his head and gave no command.

The sad conclusion drawn from the above—a chain of violations of flight regulations and negligence in the performance of their jobs by a number of people in responsible posts.

What conclusions can be drawn from the examples cited above? First and foremost, there must be a scrupulous and very concrete approach in full compliance with all regulations to allowing a pilot to fly, depending on weather conditions, the difficulty of the flight mission, and the level of the pilot's training and experience. This must be implemented on the basis of accepted standards outlined in existing regulations.

In connection with a rather marked tendency towards a decline in the professional level of flight personnel for

reasons cited above and the lack of opportunities for conducting the necessary number of flights, much more attention must be devoted to the ground training of the air soldiers. This training should include theoretical studies, as well as training in the cabins of airplanes and helicopters, and such. The flight simulators, which often stood idle in the past, should also be used to full capacity.

The specialists in the aviation-engineering service must triple their level of care to prevent the possibility of flights being undertaken in winged machines that are in a state of disrepair. Particular attention should be paid to those airplanes and helicopters that are reaching the end of their service life or require repairs. You cannot, after all, fix a breakdown in the air. Just as much diligence, a responsible attitude to their jobs, and reliable care for equipment and how it performs are required of all specialists in airfield, weather, and medical services, flight operations groups, and others.

Obviously, the best way to improve flight safety is to supply all the necessary fuel and lubricants and spare parts needed for conducting the full schedule of flights on regular aviation equipment. This, however, is something that we can only wish for. Our present reality is somewhat different. And it requires that we do everything possible, and even the impossible, to ensure that the number of landings equals the number of takeoffs by the airplanes and helicopters of the Air Force of Ukraine.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Escalation of Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

94UM0352A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Denisov under the "Events and Comments" rubric: "Peace Arrives; Continuation of War Deemed Impossible"]

[Text] The end of March was marked by further escalation of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. According to Abkhazian sources, the Abkhazians' offensive was crowned by their taking certain populated localities and establishing complete control of the Kodorskiy Pass. At

the same time, the Ministry of Defense Press Center of the Georgian Republic is not entirely clear in its statement regarding the skirmishes occurring there.

Georgian state head Eduard Shevardnadze, refuting to some extent the reports of his own Ministry of Defense, stated in a parliamentary session that in the last several days there has been a definite stabilization of the situation in Abkhazian Svanetia. He stressed that "Georgian authorities have not exhibited any military initiative." The republic intends to maintain a peaceful course until it exhausts all possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

In this connection, it pays to keep in mind that Tbilisi at first awaited an "historic resolution by the U.N." However, hopes for active intercession by this organization in the settlement process have not been realized. The U.N. secretary-general closed his report to the Security Council with the conclusion that conditions do not presently exist for the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia.

Tbilisi's attempt to resolve the Abkhazian problem with as little bloodshed as possible and, essentially, by the use of outside forces, is understandable, since Georgia is simply incapable of waging a war due to political, economic, and a number of other factors.

It is presently difficult to say what further actions the Georgian authorities will take. However, it is obvious that they have no appetite for reinstituting large-scale combat activities. Hence the insistent petitioning of the Russian leadership, which will react, as Tbilisi expects, in a more positive manner compared to that of the world community. Hence the quite open discussion of the possible outcome: Abkhazia's becoming a Russian protectorate, one in which a military presence will be virtually legitimized.

It is true that experts do not exclude another possibility. The insertion of Russian peacekeeping forces into Abkhazia will not be detrimental to the Georgian Republic's sovereignty and its territorial integrity. This may also cool the ardor of the Gudauta leaders and force them to seek compromises at the conference table, since the last rounds of talks produced virtually nothing positive. In any event, the essential consideration is that Georgia is willing to sacrifice quite a bit to avoid waging a new large-scale and bloody war.

ARMS TRADE

Statute On Export Of Military-Related Goods, Resources

94UM0302B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
16 Mar 94 p 4

[Presidential directive, government decree, and statute on export controls for military-related goods and resources]

[Text] Russian Federation Presidential Directive "On Controlling Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Other Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Scientific-Technical Information That Can Have Applications in the Development of Weapons and Military Hardware."

1. To confirm the List submitted by the Russian Federation government of certain types of raw and other materials, equipment, technologies, and scientific-technical information that can have applications in the development of weapons and military hardware and whose export is controlled and carried out under licenses (appended).
2. To direct the Russian Federation government to confirm the Statute on the procedure for controlling exports from the Russian Federation of certain types of raw and other materials, equipment, technologies, and scientific-technical information that can have applications in the development of weapons and military hardware.
3. To establish that the foreign economic activity product codes indicated in part one of the List appended to this directive may, if necessary, be clarified by the Russian Federation State Customs Committee, with the concurrence of the Russian Federation government's Commission on Export Controls.
4. To declare null and void Russian Federation presidential directive No. 408-rp of July 30, 1992.
5. This directive shall enter into force upon being signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation
February 11, 1994
No. 74-rp

Note: The list cited in paragraph one is not being published.

Russian Federation Government Decree No. 197 of March 10, 1994, Moscow, On Confirming the Statute on the Procedure for Controlling Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Other Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Scientific-Technical Information That Can Have Applications in the Development of Weapons and Military Hardware.

In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Directive No. 74-rp of February 11, 1994, "On Controlling Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Other Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Scientific-Technical Information That Can Have Applications in the Development of Weapons and Military Hardware," the Russian Federation government resolves:

1. To confirm the appended Statute on the Procedure for Controlling Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Other Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Scientific-Technical Information That Can Have Applications in the Development of Weapons and Military Hardware.
2. To instruct the Russian Federation government's Commission on Export Controls, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Russian Federation State Customs Committee, to ensure the establishment of controls on exports from the Russian Federation of certain types of raw and other materials, equipment, technologies, and scientific-technical information that can have applications in the development of weapons and military hardware.
3. To declare null and void Russian Federation government Decree No. 469 of July 5, 1992, "On Confirming a List of Certain Types of Raw and Other Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Scientific-Technical Information That Have Applications in the Development of Weapons and Military Hardware and Whose Export Shall Be Controlled and Carried Out Under Licenses in 1992-1993" (Collection of Russian Federation Presidential and Government Acts, 1992, No. 4, Item 181).

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation government

Statute on the Procedure for Controlling Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Other Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Scientific-Technical Information That Can Have Applications in the Development of Weapons and Military Hardware.

1. This Statute sets forth a series of measures to control exports of certain types of raw and other materials, equipment, technologies, and scientific-technical information that can have applications in the development of weapons and military hardware (referred to hereafter as dual-use goods and services).
2. The procedure for controlling exports from the Russian Federation of dual-use goods and services shall entail:
 - the preparation and issuance of authorization findings on the export of dual-use goods and services included in the List, confirmed by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No. 74-rp of February

11, 1994, of certain types of raw and other materials, equipment, technologies, and scientific-technical information that can have applications in the development of weapons and military hardware and whose export is controlled and carried out under licenses (referred to hereafter as the List);

—the licensing and customs clearance of exports of dual-use goods and services.

3. All economic entities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, regardless of type of ownership, when concluding contracts for the export (transfer, exchange) of dual-use goods and services included in the List, shall be required to specify in the contract text the end users of the goods and services being exported, the purpose for which they will be used, and undertakings by the importer that the goods and services will be used solely for the stated purposes, which shall not be related directly or indirectly to the production of weapons and military hardware, and will not be re-exported or transferred to any party without the exporter's written consent.

The undertakings must be specially filed by the importer with a duly authorized state agency of the importer-country for each specific transaction involving the delivery of each exported object included in the List, in the form of an international (national) import certificate or equivalent document, or, in the absence of a procedure for filing an import certificate, in the form of a document containing the undertakings specified in paragraph one of this point, with a notarized Russian language translation.

4. In the event of the absence in the importer-country's legislation of regulations relating to export controls for certain dual-use goods and services or the absence of the dual-use goods or services being imported from the Russian Federation in the national control list of the importer-country, it shall be necessary to present an official document (certification) to this effect issued by a duly authorized state agency of the importer-country.

In this event, the importer's undertakings in the contract text shall constitute sufficient grounds for export. An extract from the trade register of the importer-country or other document confirming the legal status of the foreign importer in accordance with the legislation of the country in which it is located, with a notarized Russian language translation, shall be appended to the aforementioned documents.

The contract text must include a mandatory provision specifying the exporter's right to verify that the exported goods or services are being used for the stated purposes.

Verification of compliance with the undertakings of foreign importers with respect to the use of dual-use goods and services imported from the Russian Federation shall be organized in the procedure specified in

Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Decree No. 1030 of October 11, 1993.

In the event that efforts to verify compliance with the importer's undertakings reveal a breach of those undertakings or noncompliance with them, the contract shall be subject to dissolution.

5. The obtaining of licenses for the export (transfer, exchange) of dual-use goods and services included in the List shall be mandatory for all economic entities on the territory of the Russian Federation, regardless of type of ownership; this shall apply to all types of foreign economic activity, including direct production and scientific-technical ties, coastal and border trade, and barter operations, in accordance with this Statute.

The export (transfer, exchange) of dual-use goods and services included in the List shall be carried out only on the basis of one-time licenses issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

An export authorization finding for dual-use goods and services issued by the Russian Federation government's Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls shall constitute grounds for the issuance of a license.

To obtain such a finding, the following items must be submitted to the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department): A license application completed in accordance with the requirements established by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations; a copy of the contract; a copy of the agreement between the Russian producer and the exporter (if the export of goods or services is being carried out via an intermediary); originals of the documents containing the importer's undertakings (if they are absent from the contract text) and of the importer-country state agency specified in points three and four of this Statute.

The export authorization finding shall be issued no later than 20 days after the receipt of the aforementioned documents. The finding shall be forwarded by the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department) to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and to the applicant.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations shall send information on licenses issued on the basis of findings issued by the Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls (in an agreed-upon form) to the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department).

Authorization to re-export shall be issued to Russian exporters on the basis of a re-export authorization finding issued by the Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls. To obtain a re-export authorization finding, the Russian exporter shall submit to

the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department): notarized copies of the foreign importer's contract with the third party containing the terms stipulated in point three of this Statute, and a document that contains the undertakings that follow from the contract and that has been filed with a duly authorized state agency of the third party's country in the form of an import certificate or other document specified by that country's national legislation.

6. The temporary export from the Russian Federation of equipment (goods), materials, technologies, and scientific-technical information included in the List for demonstration at exhibits and trade shows and for advertising purposes may be carried out without licenses on the basis of a finding issued by the Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls.

To obtain a temporary export authorization finding, an application shall be sent to the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department) containing information on: the type of object to be exported (specifying the foreign economic activity product code) and the quantity; the purpose of export and the manner in which the object will be used; the country of destination; the name of the exhibit (trade show); the locations where the object will be used; the period of time for which the exported object will be abroad; the name and address of the Russian organization carrying out the export; the foreign contracting parties; and the name of the customs agency that will clear the object at customs, along with an undertaking by the Russian organization exporting the object to the effect that the object will be returned.

A temporary export authorization finding shall be issued no later than 20 days after receipt of the aforementioned documents. The Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department) shall send the finding to the applicant for submission to the customs agency indicated in the finding. A copy of the finding shall be sent to the Russian Federation State Customs Committee.

7. The export from the Russian Federation of materials, equipment (goods), and technologies containing information that constitutes a state secret shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Russian Federation Law "On State Secrets."
8. The dual-use goods and services included in the List shall be subject to mandatory customs clearance in the established procedure upon leaving the Russian Federation.

The exporter shall present the obtained license to the customs agency, and the license shall constitute grounds for clearing the object for export from the Russian Federation.

When equipment (goods), materials, technologies, and scientific-technical information included in the

List are temporarily exported for demonstration at exhibits and trade shows and for advertising purposes, the temporary export authorization finding of the Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls shall be presented to the customs agency.

The Russian Federation State Customs Committee shall submit information on the export from the Russian Federation of dual-use goods and services for which the findings and licenses specified in points five and six of this Statute have been issued to the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics (the export control department) in an agreed-upon form.

9. Persons who export dual-use goods and services subject to special export controls in violation of the procedure set forth in this Statute shall be liable in accordance with Russian Federation legislation.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops Military Council Meets In Tajikistan

Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 31 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Russian Border Troops Dig In In Expectation of Assault: New Type of Outpost Set Up on Tajik-Afghan Border"]

[Text] Moscow Border Detachment, Tajikistan—Colonel-General Andrei Nikolayev, commander in chief of the Russian Border Troops, left Moscow yesterday on a flight to Dushanbe. The Russian Border Troops leadership had decided to hold a session of the Main Military Council in Tajikistan. This unprecedented event—such military council sessions have not been held in the field for a very long time—illustrates yet again the enormous importance that Moscow attaches to the situation on the Afghan border.

Even so, there has already been more than enough evidence in the past couple of weeks that the Tajik-Afghan border is today one of Russia's most important borders, even though it is separated from Russia itself by thousands of kilometers. On a trip to Dushanbe, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev visited the Moscow Border detachment. It was also visited by Russian Defense Minister Grachev, who had come to Tajikistan to see maneuvers by CIS collective peace-keeping forces. The exercises are being held with a view to the possible need to repulse a massive invasion of Tajikistan from the south, from Afghanistan. The situation on the border even worries Patriarch Aleksiy II of Moscow and All Rus, who has told Russian soldiers serving in Tajikistan that the "inviolability of the border of Tajikistan protects the inviolability of the borders of Russia, as well as of Ukraine, Belorussia and other countries." "We have to hold these lines, we will not retreat," Lieutenant-General Tymko, chief of the Russian Border Troops General Staff, told the assembled personnel of the Moscow Border Detachment's much-suffering Outpost

No. 12. One gets the impression that if, God forbid, the Tajik-Afghan border were to be breached, it would spell the end of Russia.

It is a strange border, to say the least. For a long time, the very men serving here could in no way figure it just what sort of border were they defending. The border of the Soviet Union? But it hasn't existed for a long time. Russia's border? Russia is far away. The border of the CIS? That's an abstract notion altogether. This vague situation persists in part to this day. Border markers with the inscription "inviolable" continue to stand along the Pyandzh River to this day, they were built to last. Posters and signs at the outposts say: "CIS Borders Are Inviolable!" On the faded signs, "CIS" stands out with a fresh coat of paint; under it one can clearly make out the initials "USSR." But no one here pays attention to such trifles here any more. A quite different peculiarity of this border is more prominent now—the fact this it is becoming increasingly less like a state border and more and more like a forward defense line.

Outpost No. 12 has been rebuilt—the very one that was seized and destroyed last July by fighters who slipped in from Afghanistan. Well, it's not exactly the same. The old outpost is about four kilometers away. Its half-destroyed structures can be discerned with a powerful stereo-telescope. You can't go up close, the area is heavily mined. In actual fact, there really isn't an outpost here. Thin barbed wire along a line of trenches covers the top of a 1.5-kilometer hillock. There are a pair of dug-in tanks, an armored personnel carrier, dug-in mortars and a few dugouts that afford a person at least some protection from the penetrating mountain wind and sporadic shelling. And a Russian flag on a bent flagpole proudly flies above all this. It is a completely new type of border outpost, a creation of the post-Soviet era. It is a forward post on the border of a Russian sphere of influence.

The new Outpost No. 12 has been moved about six kilometers back from the actual border. That area is a no man's land partially controlled by the border troops and partially controlled by their counterparts on the other bank of the Pyandzh—mujahedeen groups, and the armed Tajik opposition. In effect, several enemy staging grounds are scattered around new Outpost No. 12; despite constant skirmishes, efforts to dislodge the fighters have been unsuccessful. In April the border troops plan to finish mining the main trails leading from the Pyandzh to the outpost. In the meantime, they are nearly surrounded. At night, fighters approach to within range. And they fire on the outpost and launch rockets at it. They can also do this in the daytime. Last week two tank crewmen from the outpost who had gone for water (the only source is a depression half a kilometer below the outpost) encountered some fighters. Fortunately, they were able to safely escape. With sentries posted about, the men sit at their posts for three or four weeks at a time, becoming filthy and half-wild. Then they get a brief R&R, and it's back into the mountains.

Officers and soldiers are in chronic short supply. "Where and what is in supply in our country?" said Lieutenant Colonel Masyuk, shrugging philosophically. Masyuk has seen everything in his two years as commander of the Moscow Border Detachment. (Incidentally, it's curious how a person undergoes a metamorphosis on the Tajik-Afghan border. At our last meeting 18 months ago, Masyuk was a typical career border officer, albeit one serving in a hotspot, it's true. Now he is more like a combat officer fighting in a border zone than a border soldier. Routine border service is now painfully distant from the Moscow commander's responsibilities: Mining strategic areas, conducting reconnaissance, setting up a zoned defense, drawing up operational plans). As for his subordinates...

Yes, the undermanned force has clearly gotten a few reinforcements. The border detachment's half-extinct compounds have been invigorated somewhat. A few families sent to Russia during at the height of the tension in Tajikistan have returned. The Moscow Border Detachment has even opened a mini-school for officers' young children. But the number of those who serve here on a permanent basis is becoming fewer and fewer. The border detachments are switching to a system of getting officers based on a so-called "tour" method. They are sent here from other Russian border districts for six to 18 months. "At least a person knows for sure that this hell is going to end sometime," some of them told me. However, a temporary worker is temporary. The detachments have given these officers an unflattering (excuse me) nickname—"tampexes." I don't think one need explain the meaning.

"The timing of the Main Military Council field meeting is no accident," explained Lt-Gen Tymko. "The hardest time to guard the state border—summer—is beginning, and the situation here is especially unstable at that time. And judging from how much combat equipment and manpower are concentrated on the opposite bank of the Pyandzh, this spring can't help but give rise to special apprehensions. Intelligence has reported unprecedented preparations by the mujahedeen and opposition fighters to storm the border. We have to be ready to not only guard it but also defend it."

Incidentally, guarding and defending are fundamentally different notions. The concept of border service has always proceeded exclusively from the mission of guarding a border. A border soldier with a dog on patrol, a neatly plowed observation zone, an insidious intruder hobbling across the border on cow hooves—all that is from the realm of guard duty. But the border realities here constitute pure defense, for which the border troops have never been trained, for which they were never intended. The most the border guards are supposed to do is to engage an enemy advancing from the adjacent side and hold him until regular army units arrive. The "green caps" on the Tajik-Afghan border began fighting such battles several years ago. And they continue to hold their position, waiting for the army to move up. But what army? From where?

Lt-Gen Agapov on Organizational Development of Border Troops

94UM0356A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Apr 94 p 6

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Boris Agapov, vice president of Ingushetia, by Rodion Morozov, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "Opinion": "Boris Agapov: 'The State Border Has Collapsed'; Previous Spirit of Border Troops Has Been Lost Irretrievably"; photograph of Agapov included]

[Text] *Even today, Lieutenant General Boris Agapov is a very authoritative person in the Border Troops, despite the fact that it has been almost a year since he parted with them. In late 1991 and early 1992 Agapov, at that time deputy chairman for operations work (intelligence and counterintelligence) of the Committee for Security of the USSR State Border, was one of those who insisted: "The Border Troops must be common [for all]. This is not a structure to be pulled down first of all by dragging it apart to national quarters." But a different approach predominated. In the interview presented, Agapov, now vice president of Ingushetia, discusses the consequences of this and the present situation of the Border Troops.*

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] The Border Troops have lived a very troubled life for the last two and one-half years. First they are removed from the USSR KGB, then handed over to the Committee's successor, the Russian Ministry of Security, then again are made into a separate structure. From your point of view as a person who served in the Troops for almost 30 years, to what extent was their independent existence, or to the contrary, their existence within the framework of a particular department, justified?

[Agapov] The Border Troops should be independent—this is my profound conviction. It stands to reason that they must be in constant contact with services providing state security, with customs officials, and also with various ministries and departments such as the ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, Finance, and Economy, and with the Foreign Intelligence Service. But only on an independent basis, otherwise the Troops lose their appearance and their professionalism, taking on in their place the coloration and ideology of the department to which they are assigned.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] And from the very beginning, from the moment they were established, did the Border Troops exist independently or were they on someone's "leash"?

[Agapov] When the Russian Federation Border Guard was established after the Revolution (the Decree establishing it was signed by Lenin on 28 May 1918), where didn't they try to drag this Guard! Into the Ministry of Finance and into some kind of other departments, but nothing worthwhile came of this. And because the primary mission of the Border Troops is to provide state security on the border, in the final account they ended up in that department which also engaged in providing

security—on the scale of the entire country. And they fully took root in this system of OGPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB. They took root, I do not wish to hide this.

But as I said, in performing certain common functions together with security organs, the Troops unfortunately also assumed other functions alien to them, such as pure counterintelligence connected with internal problems. And some subunits even engaged in the "fifth line," the fight against ideological subversion—true, only in the border zone. Of course, Border Troops personnel did not carry on developments independently, but they collected information that was out of the ordinary and passed it on to where it was supposed to go.

By the way, here is one more argument of no small importance in favor of independence. Information which Border Troops personnel have is unique in its way: They observe the development of a situation on border territory—their own and the enemy's. But when Border Troops were part of state security organs, their information did not go to the country's leadership directly. It first went "topside," to the KGB, where it was processed, fitted, and sorted in a suitable manner, and the real picture thus was distorted substantially.

Generally there were many different slants. One time, for example, an idea was hanging around (although not carried out, it still hangs around) about subordinating the Border Troops to the Ministry of Defense, or about their organizational development according to the type of one of the branches of the Armed Forces.

What also contributed to this was the fact that, to their misfortune, Border Troops personnel were deprived of their own institute where professionals—staffers, organizers of border security, operations personnel—were trained. That is why at one time Border Troops personnel were trained at the Frunze Academy. This ended with us losing specialists in 30 years of such practice. It would turn out that on completing the Border Troops school and serving on the border 5-6 years, an officer would get to the Academy, pick up a "militaristic" intoxication, and then think only in categories of division, corps, army, front. And our troops were slanted toward the Army... True, this later was corrected, a Border Troops faculty was established right there in the Academy, and they provided Border Troops instructors. But still the spirit, way of life, and curriculum were close to that of the Army. At that time the thesis spread that the Border Troops not only should guard the border, but also defend it. Therefore, it was said, in case something happened Border Troops officers are obligated to be ready to command armies, corps and even fronts, although as a matter of fact this is absolutely unrealistic! The Border Troops are incapable of genuinely defending the border. There are border covering forces of ground troops for this.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] Then just what should the Troops' activity boil down to?

[Agapov] It isn't necessary to reinvent the wheel. The functions of Border Troops are functions of exceptional importance: Controlling entry and exit and stopping the smuggling of drugs, weapons, ammunition and explosives. When I speak of illegal crossings, I naturally have in mind not some kind of idle persons, but the work of enemy special services—insertion of illegals/spies, saboteurs, and terrorists—although of course there have been other instances as well. For example, criminals avoiding justice often tried to flee from us. Some people fled in search of political asylum, and the very same also happened in the other direction. But purely agent insertions remained the important thing.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] And to what extent did they bear a mass nature?

[Agapov] This path was used most actively after the Patriotic War. Subsequently other opportunities—technical reconnaissance, space reconnaissance—appeared, and well-adjusted technical information services began to arise. Later came the warming in relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Legal opportunities for obtaining information appeared. Superb conditions for collecting information were created on the territory of former Union states: they did not keep our secrets very well there. They acted according to the principle that someone else's secret is not my secret. In particular, Poland became such a fount of information about the Soviet Union's secrets; they were sold there right and left, wholesale and retail. So the need for a form of work such as agent insertion gradually began to disappear. But those states whose legal and technical capabilities were limited, China for example, continued to use the traditional method of inserting illegals.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] The border previously was built along the perimeter of all Soviet Union territory. How is it built today?

[Agapov] It is terrible to say this, but practically not at all. The old state border security system has collapsed and a new one has not been created. And as a result such breaches gape along the entire perimeter of Russia's borders today that it will take a minimum of 15-20 years to close them somehow. The shortsightedness of politicians and the striving to place their interests over state interests is at fault for everything.

When all this was being decided—the Union had disintegrated and the CIS had arisen—there was a group of people in the Border Troops leadership (including me) who said: "Stop and think better of it!" We insisted that we need to preserve a unified border space and ensure a smooth flow of Union Border Troops into CIS Border Troops, and this opinion found support up to a certain point. Appropriate agreements were signed and a CinC CIS Border Troops was appointed—Colonel General Ilya Yakovlevich Kalinichenko.

Then everything fell apart. There were too many who wanted to become commanders of their own Border Troops—Ukrainian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Russian and God knows what others. The presence of statehood presumes the presence of borders, they said. The fact is, already then it was understandable that not one former Union republic was capable of ensuring the independent security of its borders on a purely economic and financial basis. The result is gigantic breaches on all axes: On the Central Asiatic—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia; in the Transcaucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia; and although the border is guarded in Ukraine and Belarus, it is far from as it was before.

Only a few sectors of the "old" border—built up and with adjusted duty—were preserved: The borders with Norway, Finland, China and Mongolia. These sectors are more or less closed, but the rest... The system was established for over 70 years, bit by bit. Necessary engineer works, obstacles, observation posts, border zastavas, posts and detachments were built. All this was smoothed out and settled. They knew where to send details and where, how, and what to secure in each kilometer. But everything was pulled down in an instant.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] And how effectively did the previous system operate?

[Agapov] Five or six unpunished border violations during the year were considered a major, inadmissible failure in the work of the Border Troops. There were serious "sortings out," stern measures were taken, and people were removed from the job. The chief of a border zastava could be discharged to the reserve unceremoniously for a penetration. And if the chief of a border detachment had a minimum of two penetrations on his record, that was it; his service ended on that. So only irreproachable, hard-working organizers of border service who did not reserve for themselves the right of failure advanced in service.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] And now?

[Agapov] Now the penetration count has gone over the thousands.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] What sectors of the border traditionally were considered the most troublesome?

[Agapov] The Transcaucasus was considered the most difficult and crucial sector of operation, difficult even for purely geographical reasons: The Soviet population and the population across the border were in maximum proximity to each other, a matter of meters. You understand that it is one thing when there is a 30-40 km border strip from the main line of engineer works to the state border and it is quite another matter when it is 5-6 meters. There are more urges for contacts, illegal crossings, relations, illegal transactions and so on. It is there in the Transcaucasus, on the border with Turkey and Iran, that Border Troops personnel forged their expertise.

True, with respect to looking after the border, another troublesome sector was considered to be the Norwegian and the Baltic.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] You say that the old border security system has collapsed today. What does this threaten for the country's security?

[Agapov] There is a constant movement of weapons, ammunition and drugs across the border. Into whose hands will all this fall? That's the whole point! The criminal situation in Russia today is fraught with the most unpredictable consequences. Terrorism of all stripes and all directions is flourishing. Add to this the overall political instability.

Some kind of feverish, helpless attempts are being made to change the situation, but in vain. The conditions in which the Troops find themselves are such that they cannot cope with this task. They are incapable of providing reliable security for Russia's state borders. In addition, Russian Border Troops personnel today have to perform duty on the border of third countries. Russian Border Troops are securing the border of Tajikistan with Afghanistan, Georgia with Turkey, and Armenia with Turkey.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] But is this justified?

[Agapov] It is justified only because otherwise these borders will not be secured at all. Where is the absurdity? We do not have our own borders with these states—they are "transparent"—and so we have to secure their borders to prevent illegal movements across their territories onto Russian territory. Some generally believe that we must get out of there, post troops along Russia's present perimeter, and that's it. But this is precluded; ready-made positions and the old structure have remained on the former Union border. It is cracking and falling apart, but it still can be used. But to begin from scratch... This will take 15-20 years, not to mention the material and financial costs, which are completely beyond our capability now.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] And what is the solution?

[Agapov] Only a common border. Heads of CIS member states must sit down at the negotiating table...

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] But if we take into account that rivers of weapons and drugs are constantly flowing across uncovered borders, as you yourself say, and all this is being turned into enormous amounts of money... The fact is, this is very, very profitable for someone. Consequently, big problems may arise with the establishment of combined Border Troops...

[Agapov] Naturally, and this is why we must set the most rigid conditions today for those states from which this flow is coming. Steps must be taken to bring them to their senses. Say to them: "Brothers, either you properly close your border or we will have a stern talk with you."

Or just what do we have? I recently met with the commander of the North Caucasus Border District. So? He recently conducted a troop operation on the border between Dagestan and Azerbaijan. They confiscated around five billion rubles and detained 60 persons from who knows what countries and of who knows what nationalities, who penetrated into Azerbaijan, then tried to travel into Russia, and the other way around. But for this it was necessary to mobilize practically all district forces, and this for a one-time action, in order to close—for a time(!)—only a small sector of the border.

But this probably is not even the most terrible thing—not perforated borders or material disorder. The impression of what a Border Troops person is has been eroded and the previous spirit of these Troops has been lost. Previously in securing the border a Border Troops person secured the entire Soviet people, the whole country, and he was proud of this. But today the Border Troops person is a mercenary. He was ordered: "Go God knows where and secure God knows what." Secure what? On what grounds? Therefore, as with any person forced to do something, he does not guard, but simulates guarding. I am speaking about the officer. And what can be said about the soldier? Does he have a great need for the Georgian or Azerbaijani border so as to put his life on the line for who knows what?

Honestly speaking, when the USSR Border Troops were eliminated, many of us found ourselves in a very difficult situation. The question arose: Into which troops should we go serve—Ukrainian, Georgian, Russian, Kazakh, Moldovan or perhaps Belarusian? It was necessary to choose. But I—and not just I alone—served in the Border Troops for 30 years and guarded the safety of the Moldovan and Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian, Bashkir and Jew to an equal extent. It was all one for me. And so to go guard the border of some one republic... And I made my choice—I left the Troops. And I know many did the very same. But... Some received an apartment, some did not serve to retirement. And those who already had all this, or the young ones who had to serve 15-20 years until retirement, left. Now the "old-timers" will serve to retirement and also will leave. And again there will be a collapse. A collapse on a collapse.

Russo-Chinese Talks on Border Guard Cooperation Reported

944Q0307A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Natalya Pachegina under the heading "Contacts": "The Border as a Region of Cooperation: That Is What the Border Guards of Russia and China Want"]

[Text] Local Russian contacts between border guard districts and military and border guard structures in the People's Republic of China regarding protection of the state border, underway for several years already, now require the involvement of central ministries. Resolution of the political and professional matters that have arisen

in the process of establishing a system for protection of the state border was the subject of an initial visit by a delegation of senior members of the General Staff (the agency which, together with the PRC Ministry of Public Security, deals with border protection matters) to Moscow, where talks are underway with the Russian Federal Border Guard Service.

At a joint press conference held at the conclusion of the first stage of the Russo-Chinese talks, Col. Gen. Andrey Nikolayev, commander-in-chief of border guards and head of the Russian Federation Federal Border Guard Service, and Maj. Gen. Kui Fulin, assistant chief of the General Staff, Chinese People's Liberation Army, were unanimous in the opinion that "the borders between the great countries of Russia and China must become a region of peace and cooperation." In order to make that wish a reality it will be necessary to sign bilateral agreements at the level of border guard agencies and governmental structures in both states (primarily at issue is protection of the eastern sector of the Russian border and the Kirghiz and Tajik sectors of the CIS border). The Russian side, according to Col. Gen. Nikolayev, is prepared to present its packet of proposals during a visit to China by Russian head of government Chernomyrdin. The Chinese delegation, elaborately noting the "great amount of time required for documents to move through

official agencies in China" is not at all inclined to link its efforts with that high-level guest's visit to China.

The main focus of concern for border guard administrations in both states should be the establishment of a "civilized" border guard regime along the so-called first and second lines, i.e. at the border crossing level, with the number of crossing points commensurate to the region's economic needs. Consideration should also be given to professional contacts between Russian and Chinese border guard structures in the Russian Federation's Pacific, Far Eastern and Transbaikalian border guard districts and China's corresponding border guard provinces with regard to interdiction of violations of the state border, for the purpose of combatting organized crime in both countries.

In the opinion of Andrey Nikolayev the negotiations on reduction of arms and armed forces and on confidence-building measures and demarcation work along the Chinese-Russian border that are being conducted between diplomatic ministries in the Russian Federation and the PRC attest to the normal relations between our countries, and Russia's border guards are prepared to reinforce and expand those diplomatic successes. It did not seem that their Chinese colleagues had any objection to doing so, either.

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